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Introduction 
In a series of lectures delivered in the early 1950s and later compiled and released in print 
as How to do things with Words, J.L. Austin elaborated on the idea that the capacity of 
language to describe the world was, despite the pre-eminence habitually granted to it by 
philosophy, really just one among several capacities and that, more generally, language 
endows its users with the tool to perform certain kinds of acts, called illocutionary acts or, 
later, speech acts. Speaking, Austin argued, was really a form of action; to say something is 
always just as much to do something. In the course of the lectures, Austin introduced some 
relatively well-known theoretical ideas, such as the category of performative utterances. 
The final lecture describes a taxonomy of utterances according to their illocutionary force. 
This taxonomy has for most thinkers proven less interesting than some of the moves he 
makes to get there. Comparatively few thinkers (Searle is the obvious exception, and there 
are a few others) have shown any interest developing, applying or criticising Austin's 
taxonomy. The initial isolation of the class of performative utterances, on the other hand, 
despite the fact that it turns out to be for Austin essentially no more than a piece of 
intellectual scaffolding, has provoked an ongoing debate and numerous elaborations in 
fields as diverse as sociology, literary criticism and gender theory, as well as analytic 
philosophy.  
This paper has three chapters. Chapter One comprises a summary of How to do things with 
Words, followed by a brief discussion of some issues arising from it. The summary is 
expository, although rather than being comprehensive it focusses on matters relevant to the 
following chapters. The brief discussion that closes the chapter looks at a question in 
analytic philosophy (whether someone who makes a promise simultaneously states that 
they are promising), raises the question of the precise sense in which illocutionary acts are 
acts at all, and how illocutionary acts are related to the existence of conventions. 
Chapter Two describes the work or several writers who have been influenced by Austin, and 
How to do things with Words in particular. John Searle was a student of Austin's and the first 
writer to produce a substantial critique of Austin and an elaborate the theory of speech 
acts. Searle's most enduring contribution is probably his taxonomy of speech acts, which 
became a more or less standard point of reference, in contrast to Austin's, which faded into 
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obscurity. The lack of interest in Austin's taxonomy since Searle published his is not 
especially surprising, since the latter is presented with a great deal more confidence. It has 
not been without its critics, however: anthropologist Michelle Rosaldo, for example 
published an influential critique of it in which she argued that it presented features of 
contemporary American culture as if they were universals, when in fact other cultures have 
completely different ways of organising speech acts (Rosaldo 1982). In this chapter I also 
look at Jacques Derrida's reading of Austin (Derrida 1988), which picks up on the aspects of 
language that Austin and Searle excluded from their theories and raises some important 
problems in the relationship of speech acts and personal agency to which Austin and 
particularly Searle seem to be committed. I then look at what the sociologist Pierre 
Bourdieu (Bourdieu 1992) made of certain Austinian ideas in his explorations of language 
and power, and end with a brief outline of one way in which speech acts have been 
analysed by empirical researchers (Blum-Kulka & Olshtain 1984), to illustrate that a very 
different breakdown of the speech act may be appropriate for different purposes.  
Apart from Searle, the volume of whose output on the topic makes his inclusion in this 
chapter uncontroversial, the selection of writers presented in Chapter Two probably seems 
eclectic, not to mention uneven. Where for example are Kent Bach and Robert Harnish? 
Though Bach and Harnish are no doubt significant scholars in the field, their interest seemed 
to me too narrowly philosophical. I have chosen theorists who have raised questions about 
speech act theory at an arguably more fundamental level, pointed out gaps in its coverage 
or brought in insights from other disciplines. The reason for this is that Chapter Three 
presents a new classification of speech acts, partly as a way of re-examining the foundations 
of speech act theory, and partly with the aim of modifying it to extend its coverage to a 
greater range of communication phenomena. It is a model of illocutionary forces, instead of 
illocutionary acts, that aims to meet some (if not all) of the challenges to the classification of 
speech acts presented by the theorists covered in Chapter Two. This is done, principally, 
through an integration of Searle's taxonomy, modified in several important ways, with 
Roman Jakobson's model of the functions of language (Jakobson 1960, 1980).  
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Chapter 1: Austin 
In this chapter I introduce the concepts that formed the basis of speech act theory. It 
consists of a summary of How to do things with Words, the famous and influential 
compilation of J.L. Austin’s famous and influential 1955 William James lectures, followed by 
discussion of various aspects of that work that will be important for the chapters that 
follow. Joseph, Love & Taylor 2001 contains a similar summary of Austin’s work. This 
summary differs from theirs in that it focusses almost exclusively on How to do things with 
Words, Austin’s most systematic elaboration of his ideas about (what would later come to 
be known as) speech acts. I also have less to say about his philosophical method (“ordinary 
language philosophy”) and its application to traditional philosophical problems, and more to 
say about the significance of his analysis for the traditional and more recent concerns of 
linguistics, such as semantics, pragmatics and indexicality. 
1.1 Performatives and constatives 
In the first lecture, Austin introduces a category of sentences whose utterance do not seem 
to be straightforwardly true or false, despite apparently having the same grammatical form 
as sentences used to make ordinary statements of fact, like ‘the cat is on the mat’ or ‘water 
is H2O.’ These sentences do not appear to describe a state of affairs in the world, but rather, 
uttered in the appropriated context, act on or form part of an action in the world. He calls 
these sentences performatives and gives some examples1: 
E.a ‘I do (. . . take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife)’ – as uttered in the 
course of the marriage ceremony. 
E.b ‘I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth’ – as uttered when smashing the bottle 
against the stem. 
E.c ‘I give and bequeath my watch to my brother’ – as occurring in a will. 
                                                          
1 Later, sentences such as these will be redefined as explicit performatives. 
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E.d ‘I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow.’2 
(Austin 1962, 5) 
In the appropriate context, the utterance of sentences like these effects some change in the 
social world, unlike a statement, which simply mirrors the world: after the utterance, some 
people become married or gain the rights to a watch, for instance. Austin asserts as obvious 
that these utterances are neither true nor false (Austin 1962, 6).3 But there is nevertheless, 
he continues, a corresponding distinction that can be drawn among utterances of these 
sentences. Depending on various factors, things can go wrong, causing the utterance to be 
infelicitous. E.a might be uttered when the groom or bride is already married to someone 
else, or by an actor in a play, E.b when I am not the person authorised to perform the 
ceremony, E.c when the watch does not belong to me or when I don't have a brother, E.d 
when I plan to leave town in the evening. Some performative utterances may go wrong in a 
slightly different way: someone might say ‘I promise to do X’ who has no intention of doing 
X, or ‘I apologise for doing Y’ when they feel no remorse for having done Y. 
In summary, various features of the context of utterance, physical, social and/or 
psychological, must be right for performatives to function in the expected way. Austin gives 
the following list (which I have condensed slightly) of necessary conditions for a 
performative to be felicitous: 
A. The must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain 
conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words, 
and the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be 
appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure. 
B. The procedure must be executed correctly and completely by all participants. 
Γ. If the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts or 
feelings, or for the inauguration of consequential conduct by any participant, 
                                                          
2 Austin gives several lists like this in How to do things with Words. When quoting them, I'll use the original 
numberings/letterings. 
3 This assertion will turn out to have surprisingly long philosophical legs (see 1.6.1 below). 
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then that participant must (i) have those thoughts or feelings, or (ii) must 
intend to conduct themselves in the way indicated by the procedure and 
actually so conduct themselves. 
(Austin 1962, 14-5) 
If I violate conditions A or B, for example if I approach someone in the street and say ‘I 
bequeath to you this lamppost’ or ‘I pronounce you guilty and sentence you to life 
imprisonment,’ my utterance fails as a performative: It does not act on the world in the way 
it would have if I had been invested with the appropriate powers and been in the 
appropriate locations (wearing, perhaps, the appropriate dress, etc.). Such violations result 
in a misfire. Violating condition Γ, on the other hand, does not cause the utterance to fail as 
a performative. If I make a promise without any intention of keeping it, I have still made a 
promise: the promisee may still reasonably be upset if I don’t do what I said I would. Austin 
calls such violations abuses. Austin refines the classification of infelicities further, but the 
distinction between misfires and abuses is sufficient for the purpose of this summary. In any 
case, much of his discussion of these finer distinctions (Lectures III and IV) shows that they 
are blurred.  
Austin points out that we can sometimes do the same thing by saying something different, 
or even without saying anything (Austin 1962, 8). We can bet by pushing forward a stack of 
tokens, for example. The notion of infelicity, too, applies to any conventional act, regardless 
of whether it involves language (Austin 1962, 19) (sports are full of examples: foot-faults in 
tennis, handball in soccer, forward passes in rugby, no-balls in cricket, etc). But where 
language is involved, performatives are also vulnerable to kinds of “failure” that affect all 
speech (Austin 1962, 21-2). Like all sentences, performative sentences uttered by actors in a 
play, or muttered to oneself, are “in a peculiar way hollow or void.” Austin considers such 
utterances to be “parasitic”4 upon their “normal” counterparts and to form a category 
which he calls “etiolations” of language (Austin 1962, 22). Though he acknowledges that a 
more general account might include these kinds of utterance, these exclusions sparked a 
heated debate which will be touched on in Section 2.3. Similarly, performatives can fail if 
                                                          
4 An unfortunate choice of word perhaps (see Section 2.3 below). 
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the language used is not understood by the relevant people. My own purpose in this paper 
is in part to address this second exclusion, which has been taken over by much subsequent 
writing on speech acts. 
1.2 Performatives and constatives? 
Although performatives are not themselves true or false, there are nevertheless sentences 
that will be true if a performative has been felicitously uttered. If someone has promised, 
for example, then it is true (trivially) that she has promised; it is also true that she has 
committed herself to some future course of action. Conversely, there are certain well-
known relationships between constatives (Austin’s word for utterances that are traditionally 
analysed according to their truth value) which suggest that they are subject to criteria of 
felicity just as much as performatives are (Austin 1962, 46). Consider Moore’s Paradox; the 
absurdity of the statement ‘It is raining, but I don’t believe that it is raining.’ There is no 
logical contradiction; it may well be raining even though I do not believe that it is raining, 
and considered alone, the two clauses seem as straightforwardly constative as any. Austin 
argues that Moore’s Paradox is parallel to the case of uttering a promise without intending 
to keep it. It is not true or false but simply insincere; an infelicity of type Γ, i.e. an abuse 
(Austin 1962, 50). Similarly, Austin draws a parallel between cases where a presupposition 
of a sentence is not fulfilled (as in the famous ‘the present king of France is bald,’ uttered 
when France does not at that moment have a king) and cases where a performative is 
infelicitous because some part of condition A is not satisfied (for example, attempting to 
name a ship in the absence of any ship) (Austin 1962, 50-1).5  
In short, the intuitively clear distinction between constatives, that reflect the world and are 
evaluated in terms of their truth value, and performatives, that act on the world and are 
                                                          
5 Contradictions between statements, such as ‘the cat is on the mat and the mat is not under the cat’, Austin 
suggests, might be comparable to cases such as ‘I promise to X but I ought not to X,’ although he is less 
confident of this relationship than the others (Austin 1962, 54). I think the parallel holds. A contradiction 
between statements could be true if there were two material universes, one in which each statement could 
be true. ‘I promise to X but I ought not to X’ can be felicitous if there exist two moral “universes.” The 
existence of multiple conflicting moral universes is not even unusual. Consider a soldier in war whose 
commander orders him to do something that violates his sense of right and wrong. He might say something 
like ‘I obey, but only because I must.’ Similar conflicts can arise in more everyday situations too: I might 
promise to meet you for a drink even though I really ought to be finishing an assignment, for example. 
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evaluated in terms of their felicity, seems to be in danger of disappearing. Like 
performatives, constatives are vulnerable to forms of infelicity, and like constatives, 
performatives are required to stand in a relation to facts. This leads Austin to consider some 
other possible criteria for isolating the class of performatives. He rejects a grammatical 
criterion, that performatives are sentences in the “first person singular present indicative 
active” form (for example, ‘I warn you that the bull is dangerous’) since these grammatical 
features are neither necessary nor sufficient (see 56-61); but he does note that sentences in 
this form make explicit what type of act the utterance constitutes, and refers to them 
henceforth as explicit performatives, in contrast with primary performatives. Perhaps 
performative sentences are those that are in some way reducible to this form (Austin 1962, 
62).6 This too is rejected for various reasons; for example, Austin is not convinced that ‘I am 
sorry’ is exactly the same as its explicit counterpart ‘I apologise’ (Austin 1962, 66). And most 
damagingly, any ordinary constative, such as ‘the cat is on the mat,’ can be “reduced” to the 
form ‘I state that the cat is on the mat (Austin 1962, 66).’ The criterion seems to miss the 
mark entirely. Further criteria are considered, but Austin ultimately elects to put the search 
on hold and to make a “fresh start” (Austin 1962, 91), by considering again from first 
principles the sense or senses in which to say something is to do something.7 
1.3 Locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts 
Any vocal utterance is an act insofar as it involves the creation and manipulation of sound.8 
There is always this basic physical sense, then, in which speech is an act, and Austin, 
concentrating on speech rather than writing or any other mode of communication, calls this 
a phonetic act (Austin 1962, 92). In performing a phonetic act conforming to the structure 
and using the units of a particular language, a speaker performs a phatic act. And in 
performing a phatic act with ‘a certain more or less definite “sense” and a more or less 
definite “reference,” (which together are equivalent to “meaning”)’ (Austin 1962, 93), the 
                                                          
6 This criterion is reminiscent of Searle’s Principle of Expressibility (see Section 2.1.1). 
7 Sbisa (2007) argues convincingly that the performative-constative distinction was in a sense set up to fail 
from the outset. How to do things with Words is, she argues, structured as a “proof by contradiction” of the 
thesis that there are pure constatives. 
8 Similarly, writing is always an action involving the creation of physical (possibly electronic, etc.) marks. 
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speaker performs a rhetic act. Approximately, ‘Mary said [ðəkhætɪzɒnðəmæt]’ reports a 
phonetic act, ‘Mary said “the cat is on the mat”’ reports a phatic act, and ‘Mary said that the 
cat is/was on the mat’ reports a rhetic act (Joseph Love & Taylor 2001, 101). Austin draws a 
Saussurian langue/parole distinction between the phatic and rhetic acts; the former is a unit 
of language, the latter a unit of speech (Austin 1962, 98). Phonetic, phatic and rhetic acts 
together constitute a locutionary act. The locutionary act is the act of saying something.  
A performance of a locutionary act is generally at the same time a performance of another 
act – it may be a threat, a promise, an announcement etc. – which Austin calls an 
illocutionary act. The illocutionary act is the most enduring of Austin’s contributions to 
linguistics. It is the act one performs in saying something. As locutionary acts are 
distinguished by their meaning, illocutionary acts are distinguished by their illocutionary 
force (or in certain contexts, simply force). Extending the example above, we can say that 
‘Mary announced/swore/suggested/denied that the cat was on the mat’ reports an 
illocutionary act with a force that varies according with the choice of verb. The performance 
of a successful illocutionary act requires the securing of uptake from the hearer(s), which is 
defined as the understanding of the meaning (sense + reference) and the force of the 
utterance (Austin 1962, 117).  
Lastly, Austin observes that by performing a locutionary and therein an illocutionary act, 
one can sometimes intentionally ‘produce certain consequential effects upon the feelings, 
thoughts, or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons’ (Austin 1962, 
101). What do report when we say ‘Mary persuaded/warned/convinced me that the cat was 
on the mat’? We report that Mary’s illocutionary act had a “certain consequential effect” on 
us. She changed our mind. An act having such an effect Austin calls a perlocutionary act. It is 
an act one can perform by saying something. We may achieve the effects of many 
perlocutionary acts nonverbally (for example, we can warn someone by swinging a big 
stick), and many illocutionary acts have nonverbal equivalents (in the right context we can 
promise by nodding).9 
                                                          
9 The characterisation of these categories as “acts” can be misleading. I discuss this below. 
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The distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts is an especially delicate one. 
After all, if one has secured the understanding of a hearer, have we not thereby produced a 
consequential effect on them? The illocutionary act, and even a nonverbal equivalent, 
Austin stresses, is conventional. Perlocutionary acts like convincing or persuading someone, 
on the other hand, are a matter of more than the deployment of conventions; there is no 
conventional procedure for persuading someone, no list of boxes that, if ticked, enact a 
persuasion.10 Austin explores several criteria for distinguishing illocutionary from 
perlocutionary acts, but finds none to be completely adequate (Austin 1962, 121-32). He 
then considers the relationship between illocutionary acts and his initial dichotomy. 
1.4 Revenge of the constative? 
When utterances are analysed in this way, it emerges as fairly obvious that there is nothing 
particularly special about so-called constative utterances as regards their status as acts. A 
statement of fact comprises a locutionary act (made up of a phonetic, phatic and rhetic 
acts), it has a certain kind of force which distinguishes it from, for example, questions and 
promises, and it may have consequential effects on the hearer (for example, concerning the 
reputation of a third party, or on a judge in court). Thus, to make a statement is just as 
much to perform an illocutionary act as to make a promise, place a bet or issue a warning 
(Austin 1962, 133-4). This is not to say that the truth value of a statement or description is 
redundant or irrelevant or that truth has nothing at all to do with the state of the world, 
only that their illocutionary forces are just two among many (Austin 1962, 140, 148-9).  
Some of the ideas worked out with reference to performatives are reapplied to illocutionary 
acts. The categories of performative and constative are not entirely discarded, but they are 
no longer applied to sentences. Instead they are analysed as the poles of a continuum of 
interpretation: The performative or constative aspects of an utterance may be more or less 
salient depending on the context (Austin 1962, 145-6). The felicity conditions A, B and Γ are 
                                                          
10 Austin acknowledges that there is no solid boundary where semiotic conventions end and become some 
other sort of sign (Austin 1962, 119). For instance, if I draw my finger across my throat, is that a threat by 
conventional means? And what of iconic signs? Perlocutionary acts have posed significant problems for 
speech act theory. 
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carried over (Sbisa 2007, 464), and explicit performatives are utterances which make their 
illocutionary force explicit (Austin 1962, 115). 
1.5 Classifying illocutionary forces 
Having thus established that all utterances transmit an illocutionary force, Austin ends the 
lectures with a peculiarly unwieldy though admittedly tentative taxonomy of types of 
illocutionary force (Austin 1962, 149ff). The biggest problem is that taxonomy does not 
seem to be related in any principled way to the theoretical speculations that have preceded 
it (Sadock 1994, 393). Five basic categories are delineated: verdictives (‘an exercise of 
judgement’), exercitives (‘an assertion of influence or exercising of power’), commissives 
(‘an assuming of an obligation or declaring of an intention’), behabitives (‘the adopting of an 
attitude’) and expositives (‘the clarifying or reasons, arguments and communications’). Each 
is discussed alongside a list of verbs that describe typical examples and a comparison with 
the other categories. I’ll illustrate with reference to the verdictive category. 
A verdictive ‘consist[s] in the delivering of a finding, official or unofficial’ (Austin 1962, 153). 
In a political metaphor, Austin describes them as judicial, as opposed to legislative or 
executive acts, which are exercitive. Some examples are ‘estimate,’ ‘find’ (as in ‘I find the 
defendant guilty’). A verdictive may have exercitive qualities if delivered by the proper 
authority; a soccer referee may indicate that the ball has crossed the goal-line and a goal is 
thereby awarded (even if the ball didn’t really cross the line and it therefore wasn't “really” 
a goal).11 It may have commissive qualities; a judge’s guilty verdict commits him or her to 
passing a sentence, or may commit him or her to certain other innocent verdicts. It may 
have behabitive qualities; to judge someone competent or attractive is certainly to adopt an 
attitude to them. And it may have expositive qualities; saying ‘you were supposed to RSVP 
before last Thursday!’ clarifies a verbal matter. 
Austin ends the lectures by indicating (rather vaguely, it must be said) how the theory of 
illocutionary forces might help to solve problems in ethics (or at least, clarifying ethical 
                                                          
11 Consider also the contrast between the innumerable judgements that will be and have already been passed 
on Oscar Pistorius, and the judgement of Thokozile Masipa. Both are equally verdictive, not equally 
exercitive. 
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concepts) (Austin 1962, 163-4). In the next section I will discuss some issues with Austin's 
theory. I will dispose of a philosophical problem, look at his technical terms, and discuss the 
idea of perlocutionary acts. It will not be a comprehensive commentary nor will it be my 
final word on Austin in this paper; his work will continue to be relevant in the chapters that 
follow.   
1.6 Discussion 
Austin begins his first lecture with the following claim: ‘What I shall have to say here is 
neither difficult nor contentious; the only merit I should like to claim for it is that of being 
true, at least in parts’ (Austin 1962, 1, my emphasis). This straightforward claim to truth 
reminds us to ask a question of applied pragmatics: ‘What is the illocutionary force of How 
to do things with Words?’ That it is in Austin’s terms a primarily verdictive speech act is 
obvious once we ask the question, but it is something worth bearing in mind. Though 
philosophy (and remember that Austin was a philosopher, not a linguist) is exhorted to pay 
more attention to nonrepresentational aspects of language use, and a theory of truth is 
elaborated that stresses its relative unimportance, Austin does not question that the 
business of philosophy is to make statements, and this assumption is reinforced, by virtue of 
remaining unexamined.  On the other hand, we must remember that this does not entail 
that it has a “pure” constative status, and that a straightforward claim to truth is not 
necessarily a claim to straightforward truth; after all, one of the main philosophical 
conclusions of How To Do Things With Words is that truth and falsehood are ‘dimension[s] 
of assessment’ (Austin 1962, 148), not relations between signifiers and signifieds.  
1.6.1 Is a promise a statement? 
That a constative-centric view of language has prevailed in analytic philosophy of language is 
proven by the amount of attention that has been paid to a question concerning explicit 
performatives that is marginal at best unless such a view of language is adopted. Austin 
remarks in the first lecture that it is obvious that utterances like ‘I promise to be there on 
Saturday’ are neither true nor false, despite having the grammatical form of declarative 
sentences, but should be evaluated instead according to whether they are felicitous or 
infelicitous. This was the basis for his original distinction between performatives and 
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constatives, and remained an important assumption of the theory of illocutionary acts. But 
several authors (most recently Garcia-Carpintero 2013)12 have put forward versions of an 
argument that explicit performatives are in fact statements, as their grammatical form 
suggests, that are self-verifying; that is, they are made true by being uttered, like ‘I am 
speaking’ or ‘I just referred to myself.’ Some authors argue that a sentence like ‘I promise to 
be there . . .’ is simultaneously a statement and a promise, whose success as promise 
depends on its success as a statement (e.g. Bach 1975). Others argue that such sentences 
are indirect speech acts (that is, utterances whose illocutionary force is different from what 
the literal meaning of the sentence suggests) (e.g. Garcia-Carpintero 2013). These 
arguments have been met by authors defending the supposedly Austinian position (Schiffer 
1972, Searle 1989). Other authors have claimed that the solution lies in considering 
performatives in terms of their indexicality or what the utterance “shows” as opposed to 
“says” (Spielmann 1980, Johansson 2003). 
The question has taken on a life of its own in analytic philosophy, and though Austin is 
usually mentioned in connection with the question, no-one seems to have considered it in 
terms of his own theory of types of illocutionary force. This is unfortunate because the 
question practically evaporates if we do. Recall that in the theory of illocutionary acts the 
performative-constative distinction was reanalysed as a gradable feature of the context 
rather than a categorical feature of the sentence (see 1.4 above). Austin does not insist that 
a sentence be one or the other. Austin’s taxonomy of illocutionary forces confirms this: ‘I 
promise to be there . . .’ can have at the same time a commissive and a verdictive 
illocutionary force. Furthermore, we are not obliged to say that one element of its 
illocutionary force is primary and the other derived from it in some way. As an example, 
suppose I am in a public place with someone and I say them ‘I promise to be there.’ But they 
look at me skeptically so I stand up and say loudly ‘I promise to be there!’ so that everyone 
nearby becomes a witness of my promise. By this second utterance I state that I promise, 
but it is not purely a statement. The idea that more than one force may be transmitted by a 
single utterance will be important for the model described in Chapter 3 below. 
                                                          
12 See this reference for further references to earlier proponents of the position. 
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1.6.2 Austin’s terminology 
Some doubts have been raised about the status of the rhetic act and its relation to the 
illocutionary act. Austin doesn’t seem to have been overly clear about the difference 
between them; he uses the same device, direct versus indirect quotation, in one place 
(Austin 1962, 95) to distinguish the rhetic from the phatic act and in another (Austin 1962, 
101-2) to distinguish the illocutionary from the locutionary act (Searle 1968, 410-11). Searle 
argues that this is not necessarily inconsistent if we recognise that, in Austin’s examples, the 
meaning of the sentence (i.e. the rhetic act) determines what illocutionary act is being 
performed (Searle 1968, 411). He argues that all sentences contain at least some indication 
of illocutionary force, and concludes that there are no rhetic acts; there is no way of uttering 
a sentence with sense and reference without performing an illocutionary act (Searle 1968, 
412). Black (1963, 225) makes exactly the same point, and Austin himself admitted that ‘to 
perform a locutionary act is . . . eo ipso to perform an illocutionary act’ (Austin 1962, 98), so 
he clearly regarded the distinction as an abstract one. These authors have not done enough, 
I think, to show that the distinction fails as an abstraction. Nevertheless in his theory, which 
will be considered more fully in the next chapter, Searle replaces what is left of the 
locutionary act with what he calls the utterance act and propositional content.  
Some authors have claimed that describing perlocutionary acts as ‘acts’ is misleading for 
various reasons. It has been pointed out a particular illocutionary act might or might not be 
a perlocutionary act without the speaker knowing. For example, I might make some 
arguments without knowing whether my audience accepts them or merely understands 
them. It seems strange that the speaker should be in the dark about what type of act they 
have performed. Gu (1993) argues that a perlocutionary act is a “transaction” between 
speaker and hearer, and several other authors have advanced theories that emphasise the 
co-operative nature of even illocutionary acts (e.g. Hancher 1979, Attardo 1997, Reich 
2011). After all I may say something in English without knowing whether my hearer 
understands English, and therefore without knowing whether I have secured the uptake of 
my utterance (which recall is a requirement for the performance of an illocutionary act). 
Sbisa claims that Austin had a somewhat unorthodox ontology of action based on the 
ascription of responsibility. Unlike orthodox theories of action, according to which acts are 
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‘gestures of an individual, intentionally performed,’ Austin’s theory would describe anything 
for which an individual can be held even partly responsible as an act of that individual (Gu 
1993, 467). Whatever independent merits this theory has, attributing it to Austin explains 
why he was comfortable talking about perlocutionary acts; a speaker may perform an 
illocutionary act (in the orthodox sense of ‘act’), and through this act he could become 
partly responsible for certain non-conventional effects following from it (such as convincing 
a judge of a defendant’s guilt), which makes his act a perlocutionary act (in Austin’s sense of 
‘act’). 
Lastly as regards terminology, the significance of Austin’s classification in the final lecture is 
somewhat unclear. Is it a classification of forces (as it seems to be, since a particular 
utterance may belong to more than one class), or a classification of acts, which is what 
Austin says (Austin 1962, 151)? Attributing to him the unorthodox theory of action that 
Sbisa does suggests that it is in more conventional terms a classification of forces. 
1.6.3 Perlocutionary acts and “conventions” 
Austin describes the illocutionary and perlocutionary acts as being, respectively, an act 
performed in saying something and an act performed by saying something (see Section 1.3, 
page 10 above). Notwithstanding the fact that Austin devotes almost an entire lecture to 
discussing this way of distinguishing them, it is he concedes ‘at best a very slippery test’ 
(Austin 1962, 131). Austin elsewhere described the effects of illocutionary acts as being 
conventional, distinguishing these effects from perlocutionary acts (we have already noted 
the difficulties in characterising these as ‘acts’), which depend on more than the existence 
and deployment of conventions. Precisely what it means for effects to be conventional is 
not very clear. After all, I may convince someone of some fact only through using sentences, 
which are bound by linguistic conventions, but being convinced is not a conventional effect. 
Sbisa (2007) makes an interesting suggestion, according to which the conventionality of the 
effects of illocutionary acts is a matter of their being “defeasible,” i.e. ‘liable to turning out 
null and void under certain conditions’ (Sbisa 2007, 465). Defeasibility is not the property of 
being repealed or cancelled by further illocutionary acts. I might persuade someone of some 
fact, and then someone may come along and persuade them of the opposite fact; but 
persuasion is a perlocutionary act, and everyone would still agree that I had at the earlier 
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time persuaded them, even if I had been using faulty arguments. Similarly an act of 
parliament may be repealed, but we still acknowledge that the act was, at an earlier date, 
passed. A defeasible act is one that can subsequently be declared not to have happened if it 
turns out there was some infelicity in the performance (Sbisa 2007, 466). If someone writes 
in their will that they bequeath their watch to their brother, but we find out that he didn’t 
actually have a watch, we would probably say that he had not bequeathed his watch to his 
brother.13 The property of defeasibility thus serves to pick out conventional effects, which 
can be in a certain sense undone, from perlocutionary acts, which like ordinary physical 
movements, cannot be undone. 
                                                          
13 The distinction thus made should not be confused with the distinction between misfires and abuses, 
although there are some interesting similarities. 
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Chapter 2: Speech acts after Austin 
Considering speech as a variety of action does not begin or end with Austin. How to do 
things with Words was highly influential in subsequent philosophy and linguistics. The most 
prolific writer on the topic was John Searle. This chapter will therefore open with an 
examination of some important aspects of Searle’s theory of speech acts. I will also briefly 
discuss a critique of Searle’s taxonomy of speech acts from an anthropological point of view 
(Rosaldo 1982). Since Searle’s taxonomy forms the basis of the theory I outline in Chapter 
Three, it is necessary to be clear about its structural limitations. 
I’ll then look at Jacques Derrida's engagement with Austin. Derrida did not write all that 
much about Austin, but his reading was influential and also expresses some of my own 
misgivings about Searle’s theorising. Derrida also represents an approach to Austin which 
takes seriously some of those aspects of language that he, for whatever reason, excluded, 
and is therefore in some ways a precedent of mine, even if the outward form of our essays 
differs considerably.  
I’ll look briefly at the work of the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, who has discussed Austinian 
ideas in his investigations of the relationship between language and forms of power. Finally, 
I’ll give a short outline of one way in which speech act theory has been developed for 
empirical research, which differs in some interesting ways from more speculative 
treatments of the subject.  
2.1 Searle 
The study of speech acts was for Searle, as it was for Austin, initially supposed to be a means 
to a philosophical end, and in this chapter as in the last, this philosophical end will be to a 
great extent ignored. I focus on the picture of communication that is painted, what it owes 
to and in what particulars it diverges from Austin’s thought as outlined in Chapter 1, and its 
relevance to meeting the challenge of multilingual pragmatics. It is neither a comprehensive 
discussion of Speech Act Theory nor a comprehensive discussion of Searle’s philosophy. My 
sources for Searle’s views are primarily his Speech Acts (Searle 1969) and the papers 
collected in Expression and Meaning (Searle 1979), and a few other articles.  
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2.1.1 The principle of expressibility 
In Chapter One I mentioned that Searle was unsatisfied with Austin’s distinction between 
locutionary and illocutionary act on the grounds that there was not really a gulf between the 
meaning and force of an utterance, as Austin supposed there was. Searle suggested that the 
reason for this was that Austin had overlooked what he calls the principle of expressibility 
(Searle 1968, 418). In condensed form, the principle of expressibility (PoE) states that 
‘whatever can be meant can be said’ (Searle 1968, 415). A slightly more elaborated version 
of the formula is: ‘For every possible speech act there is a possible sentence or set of 
sentences the literal utterance of which in a particular context would constitute a 
performance of that speech act’ (Searle 1969, 19). Leaving aside for the moment the truth 
of the principle, which Searle does not even attempt to prove (later I will consider a 
situation described Speech Acts which proves it false), it allows Searle to make two far-
reaching claims. (a) That many “imperfect” or “indirect” uses of language, such as 
‘nonliteralness, vagueness, ambiguity and incompleteness – are not theoretically essential 
to linguistic communication’ (Searle 1969, 20). (b) That the study of a speech act can be 
reduced to the study of the sentence/sentences, whose literal utterance would in the 
appropriate context constitute a performance of that speech act (Searle 1969, 20-1). Claim 
(a) performs roughly the same function in Searle’s theory that Chomsky’s ‘ideal speaker-
listener in a completely homogeneous speech-community’ (see Chomsky 1965, 3-4) 
performs in his, substituting a predictable and bounded object of study for one that is 
unpredictable and open-ended. Like Chomsky’s principle, it results in the exclusion of much 
that is interesting and worthy of investigation if observed slavishly.14 Claim (b) seems to me 
to be an attempt to construe a speech act as something formal as opposed to functional. 
Searle does not deny that speech acts are units of communication (in fact, he suggests that 
they are the elementary units of communication (Searle 1969, 16) and therefore inherently 
functional. But he maintains that there are formal data in some sense isomorphic with the 
                                                          
14 It is actually far stronger than Chomsky’s principle. As Searle explains, in using the principle we must imagine 
not just a speaker who knows a language perfectly, but also a language that contains expressions and 
constructions for saying anything a speaker might want to say (Searle 1969, 19-20); that is, a perfect 
language. With its significance spelled out like this, the principle becomes vacuously true, but only of a 
fictional world that is very different from our own in important ways.  
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functional data, and elects to make the former the object of his study. This may be a 
legitimate move if the PoE is true; but importantly, it is not an obligatory one.15 I will not in 
general follow it, though I will frequently illustrate speech acts by writing sentences.  
The PoE does not seem to me a very robust principle. I have discussed it here because in 
many ways it embodies Searle’s project. Searle claims that it is an analytic truth (Searle 
1969, 17), like ‘a bachelor is an unmarried man,’ where as soon as one understands it one 
can no longer doubt its truth.16 The trouble with this is that the sentence contains words 
whose significance cannot be taken as obvious in the context. Perhaps on some definitions 
of ‘meant’ and ‘said,’ the sentence ‘whatever can be meant can be said’ is analytic; but that 
is not of much use in the foundations of an investigation intended to clarify just what saying 
and meaning amount to. 
2.1.2 Reanalysing the illocutionary act 
Searle’s alternative analysis of the structure of illocutionary acts is slightly more abstract 
than Austin’s. He considers the utterance of the following sentences: 
1. Sam smokes habitually. 
2. Does Sam smoke habitually? 
3. Sam, smoke habitually! 
4. Would that Sam smoked habitually.17 
(Searle 1969, 22) 
In each of these simple utterances, some words are used. In each, the same thing, Sam, is 
referred to, and also the same thing, habitual smoking, is predicated of him. The 
combination of reference and predication constitute the proposition or propositional 
                                                          
15 To adapt an image from Jerrold Sadock (1994, 406), to suppose that we are obliged to follow it is like 
supposing that we are obliged to substitute the study of living insects with the study of insects that have 
been squashed with a hammer, just because we can still tell the squashed insects apart. 
16 This is a more-or-less standard scholarly non-technical example of an analytic sentence. I am leaving aside, 
for the sake of simplicity, any questions about whether it is truly analytic. 
17 As in the preceding chapter, the numbering of lists is taken from the source. 
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content.  But these sentences are nevertheless different illocutionary acts. In each 
utterance, the speaker expresses a different relation to this propositional content. In (1) it is 
asserted, in (2) it is queried, in (3) it is ordered and in (4) it is wished for.  
The form of the utterance can be altered without changing the propositional content or the 
illocutionary force (Searle 1969, 24): ‘Mr Samuel Martin is a regular smoker of tobacco’ has 
the same propositional content and illocutionary force as (1), but is a different utterance. 
The propositional content may also be varied without changing the utterance or 
illocutionary force: an utterance of ‘I am waiting at the station’ can express as many 
different propositions as there are stations, but in each case it will be the same utterance 
and have the same illocutionary force.18 Thus it seems like the utterance, proposition, and 
illocutionary force are logically, if not in the actual performance of speech, more or less but 
not completely independent. This leads Searle to make a three-way distinction between 
utterance, propositional and illocutionary acts, to which he adds Austin’s perlocutionary act 
without any change (Searle 1969, 24-5). Searle proposes that the general form of most 
illocutionary acts is F(p), where F represents an ‘illocutionary force indicating device,’ and p 
represents a proposition (Searle 1969, 31). Notice that in this analysis the utterance act is 
part of the illocutionary act only insofar as it expresses the propositional content and 
indicates the illocutionary force.  
Searle is careful to avoid any mention of meaning in presenting this analysis, though he does 
make a clear assertion about the status of reference. Recall that one his reasons for 
rejecting Austin’s notion of locutionary act what that the rhetic act seemed to him 
sometimes to determine the illocutionary force. This is a recurring theme in Searle’s writing 
on speech acts. He is impressed by the way force sometimes seems to be determined by 
meaning, as in explicit performatives (e.g. Searle 1968; 1969 30-1), and is generally content 
to relegate those instances in which it is not so determined to the margins of his theory (cf 
                                                          
18 Similarly, though importantly Searle doesn’t say this, since he hadn’t yet worked out how he was going to 
handle indirect speech acts, the illocutionary force may arguably be varied without changing the utterance 
or propositional content: ‘It’s hot in here’ may be an assertion, a request to open a window, or an attempt 
at seduction. 
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Searle 1979, 58-75). Significantly, Searle generally prefers to talk about speaker meaning19 
rather than illocutionary force, a terminological choice which conveniently blurs the 
distinction between meaning proper and force (Searle 1969, 42-4).20 However, it also leads 
him to a very strange conclusion about a hypothetical multilingual communication situation. 
Searle describes the situation as follows:  
Suppose that I am an American soldier in the Second World War and that I am 
captured by Italian troops. And suppose also that I wish to get these troops to 
believe that I am a German soldier in order to get them to release me. What I would 
like to do is to tell them in German or Italian that I am a German soldier. But let us 
suppose that I don’t know enough German or Italian to do that. So I, as it were, 
attempt to put on a show of telling them that I am a German soldier by reciting 
those few bits of German I know, trusting that they don’t know enough German to 
see through my plan. Let us suppose I know only one line of German which I 
remember from a poem I had to memorize in a high school German course. 
Therefore, I, a captured American, address my Italian captors with the following 
sentence: Kennst du das Land wo die Zitronen blühen? 
(Searle 1969, 44-5) 
Searle then poses the question of what the American soldier means by his utterance. Since 
speaker meaning is supposed to be determined by sentence meaning, Searle must conclude 
that he means what the sentence means; in English, this meaning is (to the best of my 
knowledge) expressed by the sentence ‘Do you know the land/country where the lemon 
trees bloom?’ This conclusion has the unfortunate consequence of severing speaker 
meaning from the communication situation, since this meaning has as much relevance to 
the communication as does the number of syllables in the utterance, or the number of 
lemon trees visible at the moment of utterance; that is, none whatsoever. The American 
soldier need not know what the sentence means; in fact the sentence need not mean 
                                                          
19 Paraphrased as ‘intends to convey,’  ‘wishes to communicate in an utterance’ (Searle 1969, 20). 
20 I will only use ‘meaning’ to refer to ‘sentence meaning.’ Meaning is a property of (some) signs, force is a 
property of (some) acts. 
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anything at all: ‘die Zitronen du Land wo das Kennst blühen’ would have done just as well. 
Also significant in its absence from the analysis is any consideration of what the sentence 
means to the hearer, in other words the nature of the uptake. Is this also to be determined 
by sentence meaning?  
2.1.3 Searle’s taxonomy of illocutionary acts 
Searle’s taxonomy of illocutionary acts is arguably his most enduring contribution to the 
theory of speech acts. It is not fatally affected by the difficulties he encounters when trying 
to reduce the illocutionary act to a kind of speaker’s meaning, and despite some misplaced 
criticisms of the earlier taxonomy as well as some new problems of its own, it is more robust 
and better motivated than Austin’s rather sketchy offering. In this section I will present the 
outline of Searle’s taxonomy. I will defer most of my criticism until Chapter Three, where I 
will present some amendments to the taxonomy, some general and some with the aim of 
accommodating multilingual communication phenomena.   
Searle’s taxonomy is built around three principal variables, which he calls illocutionary point, 
direction of fit and expressed psychological state (Searle 1979, 2-5). Illocutionary point is 
basically the purpose of the act, what it is for: commands are for trying to get someone to 
do something, promises are for committing speakers to certain actions, apologies are for 
registering one’s sorrow or regret, and so on. This is the most important dimension of the 
illocutionary act. Direction of fit has to do with how the act (precisely, its propositional 
content) relates to the rest of the world. Searle illustrates this with an example from 
Elizabeth Anscombe which captures the idea excellently (Anscombe 1957, cited in Searle 
1979, 3). A man goes to a shop with a shopping list given to him by his wife. He is followed 
by a detective who writes down every item the man puts in his trolley. When the man 
leaves the shop, the detective’s list will look exactly like the man’s shopping list, but they 
will have been constructed differently. The man has fitted the contents of his trolley to the 
pre-existing list, whereas the detective has fitted his list to the contents of the man’s trolley. 
The shopping list has a world-to-word direction of fit; the detective’s list has a word-to-
world direction of fit. Expressed psychological state is the mental state of the speaker 
associated with the illocutionary act. For assertions, it is belief; for promises, intention; for 
requests, desire. In addition, some illocutionary acts will have restrictions on the 
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propositional content they may be used with; for example I cannot promise to have done 
something in the past, or congratulate you for the fact that ice is less dense than water. 
Using these variables, Searle proposes that there are five basic illocutionary act types: 
Assertives, directives, commissives, expressives and declarations (Searle 1979, 12-20). 
Assertives are generally assessable in terms of their truth value. Directives are things like 
commands and requests which attempt to get the hearer to do something. Questions (yes-
no and wh-) are placed somewhat uneasily in this category, on the grounds that they are 
attempts to get the hearer to say something (Searle 1979, 14). Commissives are things like 
promises which commit the speaker to some future action. Expressives are things like 
apologies, congratulations and thanks, which are expressions of the speaker’s psychological 
state. Declarations are utterances, like ‘I find the defendant guilty’ as uttered by a judge, 
that bring about some change in the status of someone of something by their very 
utterance in the appropriate context. I condense Searle’s description of these types in the 
following table.  
Illocutionary 
point 
Class symbol Direction of fit Expressed 
psych. state 
Propositional 
content 
Assertive ├ ↓ Belief B p 
Directive ! ↑ Wish/desire W H does A 
Commissive C ↑ Intention I S does A 
Expressive E Ø (P) S/H + property 
Declaration D ↕ Ø p 
 Table 1. Searle’s taxonomy of illocutionary acts21 
This table requires some explanation. The down arrow indicates word-to-world and the up 
arrow world-to-word direction of fit. The Ø in the third column indicates that the 
propositional content of expressives is in a sense presupposed; if I apologise for stepping on 
your toe, it is assumed that I did step on your toe (Searle 1979, 15). The double arrow in the 
final row indicates a double direction of fit. Searle argues that declarations generally require 
                                                          
21 Searle says that, for example, declarations have the form D↕Ø(p). This seems redundant to me; rather he 
should say that declarations, D, have the form ↕Ø(p), or D = ↕Ø(p). 
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an extra-linguistic institution to be effective (word-to-world fit); but their successful 
performance brings about some change in the status of some parts of the world (world-to-
word fit) (Searle 1979, 18-9). The bracketed P in the fourth column indicates that the 
psychological state expressed by an expressive is dependent on the propositional content. 
The Ø in the fourth column indicates that declarations do not usually depend on the speaker 
expressing a psychological state; he or she simply executes a procedure. p in the final 
column indicates that there is no special condition on the propositional content of assertives 
and declarations. 
Searle expresses some dissatisfaction that the directive and commissive categories have the 
same direction of fit, but is unable to find a way of assimilating them. In order to do this, he 
assumes, ‘one would have to show that promises are really a species of requests . . . or 
alternatively . . . that requests placed [sic] the hearer under an obligation’ (Searle 1979, 14-
5). This seems to me like assuming that in order to place lions and tigers in the same animal 
category one would have to show that lions are actually tigers or tigers are actually lions. 
One of Searle’s main criticisms of Austin’s taxonomy was that many illocutionary acts fell 
into more than one category (Searle 1979, 12). However, by his own admission, his system 
suffers from overlaps too. Some declarations have assertive properties; a judge’s guilty 
verdict may be “false” in a certain sense if the defendant is actually innocent (Searle 1979, 
19-20). An apology may be a declaration if, for example, it has been demanded by an 
authority. And questions are only indirectly directives, since the action they seem to 
demand on the part of the hearer is not contained in the proposition: the propositional 
content of the question ‘does Sam smoke habitually?’ is not of the form ‘H does A.’22 It 
seems to me that the best (perhaps only) way out of this problem is to interpret it as a 
classification of forces rather than acts, as I did with Austin’s taxonomy.23 Then we simply 
admit that the illocutionary force of any actual speech act is typically multidimensional and 
composed of several elementary forces with varying levels of strength. We also do not have 
                                                          
22 Austin's system is completely silent on the classification of questions, as far as I can make out. 
23 Sadock (1994) devised a system that implies elementary forces rather than acts. In his system, speech acts 
are analysed according to their position on affective, effective and informational axes. 
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to insist that this or that set of elementary forces is the one true set (just as in describing a 
point in physical space we may use various co-ordinate systems). 
2.2 An anthropological critique of Searle’s taxonomy 
A small, finite and universal set of elementary speech act types, expressed in metaphysically 
neutral terms and motivated independently of the grammatical structure of any one 
language – in short a universal pragmatics – would be of much value to anthropology since 
it would provide a sound basis for the comparison of different linguistic cultures in much the 
same way that biological kinship relations provide a stable basis for the comparison of 
kinship terms, or the way that universal grammar would provide linguistics with a sound 
basis for the comparison of languages. Some writers have used Searle’s taxonomy as a first 
step towards this universal pragmatics. However, in Speech Acts Searle seems explicitly to 
disavow any claims to applicability for his theory: 
. . . the mistakes I shall make in linguistic characterizations in the course of this work 
will be due to such things as not considering enough examples or misdescribing the 
examples considered, not to mention carelessness, insensitivity, and obtuseness; but 
. . . they will not be due to over-hasty generalization from insufficient empirical data 
concerning the verbal behavior of groups, for there will be no such generalization nor 
such data. 
(Searle 1969, 14, my emphasis) 
It is not unusual for theories to be presented with an implicit or explicit statement of their 
limitations. Certainly, we can heed such warnings, and refrain from applying a theory to 
certain situations. But it seems to me much more interesting and productive to push a 
theory beyond its limits, to confront it with real empirical data (as Rosaldo does) or more 
complex hypothetical situations (as I will do), even if in doing so we so to speak void our 
warranty.  
Anthropologist Michelle Rosaldo presented ethnographic data on the speech acts of the 
Ilongots of the Philippines, amongst whom she spent more than two years doing fieldwork, 
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that raised questions about the universality of Searle’s five basic categories. The core ideas 
of her critique are captured in the following quotes:  
[T]he difficulty with such categories as “assertion” and “expression” when applied to 
Ilongot acts of speech is that they do not help us comprehend the common Ilongot 
understandings of the designated acts . . . Ilongot notions lead, instead, to my 
proposal that Ilongot speech acts be distinguished as “declaratives” and “directives.” 
Searle uses English performative verbs as guides to something like a universal law. I 
think his efforts might better be understood as an ethnography - however partial - of 
contemporary views of human personhood and action as these are linked to 
culturally particular modes of speaking. 
(Rosaldo 1982, 228) 
Rosaldo argued that, despite being described in such apparently culturally neutral terms as 
psychological state, direction of fit and propositional content, Searle’s five-fold classification 
of illocutionary act types in fact relies on culturally specific notions of language and 
personhood (Rosaldo 1982, 204). Whereas Searle defined his categories in terms of 
speakers’ states, this would be an inappropriate structuring principle for categorising the 
speech acts of the Ilongots. It would be more appropriate, she claimed, to classify their 
speech acts according to whether they correspond to a social situation characterised by 
“sameness” and autonomy, or continuity and hierarchy, and therefore24 whether they 
demand some sort of response from their audience (Rosaldo 1982, 222). In Searle’s terms, 
this divides speech acts somewhat arbitrarily into directives and “others”; but it is precisely 
Rosaldo’s point that such a division reflects Ilongot language practices and ideologies more 
naturally. 
Ilongot directives are further divided into tuydek (“commands”), bēge (“requests”) and 
tengteng (“orders, warnings”) (Rosaldo 1982, 224-6). Tuydek typically require the recipient 
to move somewhere and/or interrupt what they are doing and are generally restricted to 
                                                          
24 This implication follows from features of the structure of Ilongot society Rosaldo explains in some detail. In 
general, my abbreviated exposition is likely to make Rosaldo’s work (and hence Ilongot society) seem more 
cryptic than it really is. 
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easily accomplished, proximate tasks (‘go and fetch water for me,’ ‘pour it out’) (Rosaldo 
1982, 224-5). Bēge require less movement or interruption and are also restricted to 
proximate tasks (‘give me some betel, supplies,’ ‘eat this’) (Rosaldo 1982, 225-6). Tengteng, 
finally, deal with more open-ended, contingent affairs; they ‘focus less on finite tasks to be 
performed within a circumscribed social context than to chart a course of future action with 
still undetermined limits’ (‘when you are in the lowlands, buy me . . . ,’ ‘ask uncle for a 
pencil’) (Rosaldo 1982, 226). 
As readers will no doubt recognise when they read Chapter Three, Rosaldo’s critique of 
Searle’s taxonomy will apply to my model as well. It is in the end only an elaboration of that 
taxonomy. But I do think that a classification of forces is more flexible than a classification of 
acts because it doesn’t require one to assign a particular speech act to a single category. My 
purpose has been to capture a wider range of language phenomena, and I believe it attains 
that objective successfully, even if it is not entirely culture-neutral.  
2.3 Austin, Searle and Derrida  
The contrast between the theory of Derrida and Searle could hardly be more stark. Where 
Searle is economical, systematic and unambiguous, Derrida is rich, literary and above all 
suggestive. Given their contrasting styles, one often gets the impression that they would not 
even realise if they were saying the same thing. It is therefore hardly surprising that they 
came into conflict over the interpretation of How to do things with Words. It might 
reasonably be expected that this section will contain some analysis of this conflict, 
culminating, perhaps, some statement of affiliation with one of two theoretical traditions 
which the disputants are supposed to stand for. In fact, I will have little to say about the 
exchange of veiled and unveiled insults and misunderstandings that goes by the name of 
“the Searle-Derrida debate.” My representation of Derrida’s position is drawn from Limited 
Inc (Derrida 1977), primarily Signature Event Context in that volume.  
Derrida begins Signature Event Context by noting various problems arising from the very 
extensive polysemy of the word ‘communication’ (Derrida 1977, 1).  Although in practice, 
context usually helps to limit the ambiguity of the word, Derrida claims that the context of 
speech action can never be exhaustively described (Derrida 1977, 2-3). He suggests that ‘a 
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certain generalisation and a certain displacement of the concept of writing’ follows from 
this that will invert some traditional philosophical assumptions about communication 
(Derrida 1977, 3). The structure of this argument is interestingly similar to that of Austin’s 
argument for the abandonment of the rigid distinction between performative and 
constative utterances and the traditional privilege accorded to the latter. As will be seen, 
Derrida seems in some ways to be trying to do for writing what Austin did for performatives. 
In outline, both arguments have the structure of a proof by contradiction of a received 
philosophical position: a position P is assumed; it is argued that this assumption leads to an 
untenable position Q, which obliges one to reject the position P. In both cases this is 
followed by an inversion of traditional priorities. 
The essential characteristics of the classical concept of writing are, according to Derrida, 
that it is iterable; that is, it continues to function as writing in the absence of its producer: 
For a writing to be a writing it must continue to “act” and to be readable even when 
what is called the author of the writing no longer answers for what he has written, 
for what he seems to have signed, be it because of a temporary absence, because he 
is dead or, more generally, because he has not employed his absolutely actual and 
present intention or attention, the plenitude of his desire to say what he means, in 
order to sustain what seems to be written “in his name.” 
(Derrida 1977, 8) 
This fact complicates the determination of the communicative context in the case of writing. 
Writing can be separated from the context of its production, and can be read and reread, 
whole or in part, in an open and unfixable range of contexts. The original producer 
abandons his written text to its “essential drift,” during which the original connections 
between signifier and signified may loosen or be remade, and it may be cited and/or 
grafted25 onto another text, by whoever chances to read it (Derrida 1977, 9).     
                                                          
25 Note: for obvious reasons, the convention I have adopted elsewhere in this paper of introducing technical 
terms (i.e. words given a special significance by the author concerned) by italics will function in a slightly 
different way in this section. I leave it to the reader to interpret the italics here. 
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Having thus described the essential characteristics of the classical concept of writing, 
Derrida argues that that these characteristics are not, in fact, restricted to written 
communication but can be generalised to all linguistic communication.26 Spoken utterances, 
too, can be heard and overheard, repeated in various ways, combined with new utterances, 
and are no more securely attached to their signifieds than written texts are (Derrida 1977, 
10). The context of a spoken utterance is therefore no more exhaustively determinable than 
that of the written utterance. This is a problem for Austin’s discussion of performatives, 
Derrida contends, because that discussion relies throughout on the existence of fixed, fully 
determinable contexts, which are typically required for performatives to be felicitous 
(Derrida 1977, 14). This reliance is particularly pertinent in the case of the consciousness 
(including the intentions) of the speaker, which as Derrida points out is always in a special 
way absent from the context (Derrida 1977, 7, 14). This leads Austin to overstate the 
significance of the distinction between success and failure of speech acts, and as a 
consequence also the distinction between “ordinary, serious” speech and various 
“etiolations” of language (Derrida 1977, 15-6). 
Derrida’s most influential criticism of Austin concerns his dismissal of language use he 
considers “non-serious” (such as citation, the speech of actors in a play, and so on) as an ill 
that can infect speech acts, etiolated27 and most notoriously parasitic (see section 1.1, page 
7 above). Derrida wonders whether Austin was right to have cast off this sort of language, 
and argues that the possibility of being used in such a way is one expression of a general 
property of iterability shared by all language (Derrida 1977, 17). There could be no effective 
performatives, he claims, that are not in a certain sense citations or performances that 
conform to a model (Derrida 1977, 18). Rather than oppose these kinds of utterance with 
so-called serious utterances, Derrida suggests that one might ‘construct a differential 
typology of forms of iteration’ (Derrida 1977, 18). In such a scheme, the speaker’s intention 
(and hence the dimension of success and failure) would no longer be the most important 
                                                          
26 In fact, Derrida claims that they are generalizable to all “experience.” I confess I’m not quite sure how this is 
supposed to work. 
27 ‘Deprived of strength, vigour, or effectiveness; weakened, enfeebled’ 
(http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/64848?redirectedFrom=etiolated#eid). 
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organising principle. This suggested demotion of intention, with its implicit recognition of 
difficulties of interpretation and the importance of the receiver in interaction, is the axis 
around which Derrida’s conflict with Searle turns. The model I will describe in Chapter Three 
brings into focus instead the nature of what is transmitted between sender and receiver. 
There is no communication without both sender and receiver, and it seems to me generally 
senseless to argue about which of two indispensable contributions is the more important. 
One can argue that Derrida’s idea of the essential characteristics of the classical concept of 
writing is off the mark. For example, most people will agree that writing is essentially visual, 
yet Derrida’s characterisation says nothing about the medium or channel of writing. And as 
Judith Butler points out, they also clearly have a very different relationship with the body 
(Butler 1997, 152). But since his point about the absence of the sender’s intentions from the 
context is supposed to apply to all linguistic communication, this is not such a serious 
problem. My main reason for not pursuing his idea of a typology of forms of iteration is that 
Derrida has not taken any steps toward constructing such a typology himself, and it is not 
clear that it would reveal anything interesting about pragmatics. Searle has at least made a 
start towards a typology.  
Austin’s separation of “serious, literal” utterances from fictional ones was wholeheartedly 
taken over by Searle, who did however make an attempt to account for fictional speech acts 
(Searle 1979). It is not my purpose here to present an account of the illocutionary force of 
fiction, so I haven’t examined all of its implications. Suffice to say that though his account 
may be in some way true, it is not very illuminating. It may account for the fact that fictional 
speech acts do not have the same illocutionary force as ordinary speech acts, but it does not 
account for the illocutionary force that they do have – it does not account for the fact that 
people may die over fictional representations.28 And like Derrida I am not convinced that the 
relationship between fictional and nonfictional speech is adequately represented as a 
relationship of parasitism. It is not implausible that one could learn how to promise by 
observing fictional promises. And is there any reason to assume that the first promise in 
history was not a fictional promise? Searle claims that the relationship is one of “logical 
                                                          
28 Searle does show some awareness of this. His rather banal suggestion is that it has something to do with 
‘the crucial role that shared products of imagination play in human social life’ (Searle 1979, 74). 
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dependence,” (Searle 1977) but this is not a clearly defined relation, which would seem to 
depend on superficial features of the expressions ‘promise’ and ‘fictional promise.’ 
2.4 Speech acts and power: Pierre Bourdieu 
In this section I will look at the work of Pierre Bourdieu, a theorist who developed Austin's 
ideas in the course of an investigation of the relations between language and power. His 
criticisms of Austin concern the social basis of illocutionary force. Because it focusses on 
criticisms, my account may exaggerate the differences between Austin and Bourdieu, and 
make the relationship between them seem perhaps more adversarial than it really is. I have 
drawn from Language and Symbolic Power (Bourdieu 1992), especially the essay Authorized 
Language in that volume, for my account of Bourdieu’s theorising.  
In Language and Symbolic Power Bourdieu argues that all modern linguistic theory, from 
Saussure to Chomsky, is haunted by an ‘illusion of linguistic communism’ (Bourdieu 1992, 
43) which prevents it from adequately accounting for the capacity of language to represent 
and reproduce relations of power between people. In a memorable example of the way 
language is embroiled in relations of power, Bourdieu describes how the mayor of the 
French provincial town of Pau, addressed an assembly of residents in Béarnais, the local 
language. A local French-language newspaper reported that ‘[t]he audience was greatly 
moved by this thoughtful gesture.’ Bourdieu points out that in order to interpret the 
mayor’s language choice in this way, the newspaper must subscribe to the ‘unwritten law’ 
according to which French is the appropriate language for formal occasions. Furthermore, 
the mayor gains a symbolic ‘profit’ from his ‘strategy of condescension’; he gains solidarity 
with the residents by symbolically disavowing the social hierarchy that exists between them, 
but without losing any of the prestige that comes from being a fluent speaker of French, 
because other features (not least the fact that he is the mayor) attest to this fact (Bourdieu 
1992, 68-9).  
Bourdieu does not insist that linguistic theory must incorporate a general account of social 
power; in fact he seems to suggest that its absence is a result of limitations that actually 
constitute linguistics as a science. But he does insist that if these limitations are ignored, we 
risk embarking on a wild goose chase for the source of illocutionary force: ‘[A]s long as they 
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are unaware of the limits that constitute their science, linguists have no choice but to search 
desperately in language for something that is actually inscribed in the social relations in 
which it functions’ (Bourdieu 1992, 39).  
In the essay Authorized Language (Bourdieu 1992, 107-116) and elsewhere in Language and 
Symbolic Power, Bourdieu criticises Austin in this vein, for mistakenly attributing to the 
symbolic systems of languages a power which actually inhabits social relations (Bourdieu 
1992, 107-9). Though illocutionary acts (and especially explicit performatives, for an 
interesting reason) may seem to transmit, by their mere utterance, a force that alters the 
social world, this force is really only the delegated authority of the speaker (Bourdieu 1992, 
107). This becomes evident when one considers such cases as a soldier attempting to give 
orders to a superior officer: ‘Only a hopeless soldier (or a ‘pure’ linguist) could imagine that 
it was possible to give his captain an order’ (Bourdieu 1992, 75). Bourdieu goes further: if 
the speaker delegates authority to his or her words, this is in fact not even the speaker’s 
own authority. His or her speech only acts on the world (including other people), he claims, 
to the extent that in his utterances the speaker expresses the delegated social power of a 
group, of which he/she is the authorised spokesperson (Bourdieu 1992, 109-11). The power 
of the group is, in turn, ultimately guaranteed by its material wealth, through which it gains 
access to a certain amount of symbolic capital (of which a certain kind of language, of 
accent, style, vocabulary, is only one type).   
The exercise of power through symbols is, however, not as straightforward as the exercise 
of power through, for instance, possession of a gun or knife (though it should be noted that 
the greater part of the power granted by the possession of a gun, everything apart from the 
ability it imparts to kill or injure, is in fact symbolic in Bourdieu’s sense). The power of 
language, for Bourdieu, is in some ways like the power of a toy gun, insofar as it depends 
and is founded upon an act of misrecognition that takes an arbitrary and contingent 
relationship between “real” power and certain symbols for a natural and necessary one 
(Bourdieu 1992, 170).29 It depends on a degree of ‘collaboration’ and ‘complicity’ (Bourdieu 
1992, 113) on the part of the dominated and on a degree of recognition more than 
                                                          
29 The image of the toy gun is my own. 
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understanding (in fact it may even operate in the absence of understanding) (Bourdieu 
1992, 111-3). Explicit performatives are implicated in this misrecognition because they, 
more than any other type of utterance, conceal the sociological sources of their power by 
making it appear to originate within the utterance itself (Bourdieu 1992, 111). Performatives 
are really nothing other than a ‘particular case of the effects of symbolic domination’ 
(Bourdieu 1992, 72). Austin, in locating the source of the illocutionary force of 
performatives in utterances, is seen by Bourdieu therefore to have fallen into a trap set by 
symbolic capitalists who control the means of symbolic production and are interested in 
concealing their power: he is perhaps like the diligent working class man who won’t disrupt 
the factory and believes meekly in the benevolence of his employer.  
Of course, as we saw in Chapter One, limitations on the efficacy of language, as exemplified 
in Bourdieu by the ‘hopeless soldier’ ordering his captain about, were not ignored by Austin, 
who considered them under the heading of infelicities; Bourdieu claims that in doing so 
Austin is adopting ‘a sociological point of view’ (Bourdieu 1992, 74). This seems to me an 
unnecessary piece of disciplinary border-policemanship. Bourdieu’s attribution to Austin of 
the belief that the source of the power of language was inside the linguistic system is 
perhaps too strong – his search for formal grammatical criteria of performativeness was 
designed to fail from the start, as Sbisa has argued convincingly. But it is arguably true that 
Austin does not inquire very deeply into the social conditions behind the power of language, 
and it is also reasonable to suggest that starting from a consideration of the words 
themselves is to start at the wrong end. 
Surely one must agree with Bourdieu that the relationship between symbolic power and its 
instruments (prestigious accents, languages etc) is arbitrary, and to search for power in the 
expressions themselves, considered abstractly as elements of a symbolic system, is as 
misguided as searching for the source of the meaning of ‘cat’ in the sound or spelling of the 
word. The way that, as speakers, we delegate our social power to language is similar to the 
way we assign meaning to expressions. But there is nevertheless something very interesting 
about the act of delegating authority, for delegated power is power, no less than 
undelegated, ‘direct’ power. If I delegate power to my words, then my words become 
powerful, my power in a certain way “goes into” those words, even if that power originated 
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outside them, or even, originally, outside of me. I do not therefore think it is too great a 
stretch to talk about the illocutionary force of utterances (if not of symbols), or of authority 
residing ‘in the set of prosodic or articulatory variations which define distinguished 
pronunciation’ or in the other elements of a prestigious style (Bourdieu 1992, 113), all the 
while acknowledging that this force is not a spontaneous effect of autonomous symbols, 
and that it may depend on the consent of the recipient.  
A fuller account of the sources of symbolic power would need to probe their origin more 
thoroughly. For many kinds of power turn out on inspection to be largely symbolic. The 
power derived from the ownership of land, for instance, is symbolic in the sense that the 
relation of ownership is essentially to be in possession of certain symbols (title deeds, the 
appearance of autochthony, etc.). Even the power of arms, as I pointed out earlier, is to a 
large degree and in its most productive forms, symbolic. Such an investigation might 
uncover certain problems with Bourdieu’s account. For example, I am not willing to promote 
without qualification his vision of symbolic power (and by extension, those who 
“collaborate” and are “complicit” with it) as something malignant, perhaps even evil. If as he 
sometimes seems to suggest symbolic power is ultimately traceable to a natural kind of 
power (‘the laws of social physics only apparently independent of the laws of physics’ 
(Bourdieu 1992, 111)), then it is in my view basically amoral, and it becomes unfair to 
characterise those who comply with it as “collaborators.”  
2.5 Empirical pragmatics 
The theory I have looked at so far may have given the impression that the study of speech 
acts is a purely speculative or deductive enterprise. Fine distinctions have been made, and 
their validity has been defended or disputed on the strength of their internal, logical 
coherence or incoherence, or with reference to some broader sociological theory. Examples 
of actual speech acts are infrequent, and where they do appear they are usually either 
“classic” examples from the existing literature, or anecdotes from the author’s own 
experience which are analysed according to his or her own intuitions.  
To a certain extent this picture is accurate. Nevertheless, since the early 1980s there has 
been a strong tradition of empirical research into speech acts, which is the subject of this 
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section. Since the focus of this paper is theoretical, I will look at the way in which speech act 
variables were operationalised for empirical research. For reasons of space, I will not discuss 
the various ways in which speech act data is gathered, or look at any actual studies (of 
which there are many), and I will also omit consideration of the large body of very 
interesting work that has been done in developmental pragmatics. 
A significant proportion of work in empirical pragmatics has looked at speech acts in a cross-
linguistic perspective. Of particular interest are the studies undertaken as part of or inspired 
by the Cross-Cultural Speech Act Realization Patterns (CCSARP) project (see Blum-Kulka & 
Olshtain 1984). This influential project began as an attempt to discern ‘rules that govern 
language in context,’ and to determine the extent to which such rules were universal across 
cultures/languages (Blum-Kulka & Olshtain 1984, 196).30 Initially, it focussed on two speech 
acts, requests and apologies, of native and non-native speakers of eight different 
languages/varieties, and utilised discourse completion tests (DCTs) to elicit tokens of the 
desired speech act type (Blum-Kulka & Olshtain 1984, 197-8).  
The original participants in the CCSARP project devised a ‘coding scheme’ for requests and 
apologies, on the basis of ‘general theoretical considerations’ and existing empirical work 
(Blum-Kulka & Olshtain 1984, 199).  Though they called it a coding scheme, Blum-Kulka and 
Olshtain acknowledged that it embodies substantive hypotheses about the internal 
structure of these speech acts, and is thus more than a simple labelling convention, as the 
name might be taken to suggest (Blum-Kulka & Olshtain 1984, 209). Initially, the scheme 
was worked out in detail for requests and apologies only, but other speech acts, such as 
complaints, have been similarly analysed (e.g. House & Kasper 1981).  
                                                          
30 It is particularly difficult and probably futile in the context of pragmatics to make a definite distinction 
between language and culture. 
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In outline, the CCSARP project analysis of a request divides it into an Address Term, Head 
Act and Adjunct: 
Adr. Head Adjunct 
Danny 
/ 
could you lend me £100 for a 
week  / 
I’ve run into problems with the rent for my 
apartment 
(Blum-Kulka & Olshtain 1984, 200) 
The distinction between Head Acts and Adjuncts is complicated by the fact that requests can 
be and very often are made indirectly. The first organising principle for requests is thus a 
scale of directness with three major levels: conventionally direct (‘please pass the salt’), 
conventionally indirect (‘can you pass me the salt?’) and nonconventional indirect (‘this food 
is rather bland’) (Blum-Kulka & Olshtain 1984, 201). Further dimensions of variability 
captured in the coding scheme are point of view (hearer-oriented, as in ‘could you tidy up 
the kitchen soon?’ vs. speaker-oriented, as in ‘do you think I could borrow your notes from 
yesterday’s class?’), the presence and quantity of upgraders (‘clean up this disgusting mess’) 
and downgraders (‘do you think I could…’) within the Head Act, and the nature of any 
Adjuncts (cost minimizers such as ‘… if it’s not too much trouble,’ grounders such as giving 
reasons for the request, and so on) (Blum-Kulka & Olshtain 1984, 201-5).  
The first organising principle of apologies in the coding scheme is whether or not they 
include an explicit illocutionary force indicating device (IFID; cf Searle 1969, 62), such as 
‘sorry’ or ‘I apologise’ in English (Blum-Kulka & Olshtain 1984, 206). Instead of or in addition 
to an IFID, an apology may include any number of the following semantic formulas: some 
kind of explanation of the event E that necessitated the apology (‘I didn’t see you there’), an 
expression relating to the speaker’s responsibility for E (‘I should have been more careful’), 
an offer of reparation (‘let me buy you a new one’), and/or a promise of forbearance (‘I will 
be more careful in the future’) (Blum-Kulka & Olshtain 1984, 206-7). 
Speech act taxonomies such as Searle’s attempt to compare different speech acts within the 
same language, and are constructed with an eye to formal consistency, economy and 
elegance, rather than their application to a corpus of data. The purpose of the CCSARP 
coding scheme, by contrast, was to establish a basis for comparison of request and apology 
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strategies in different languages, in a way that lent itself to use with empirical data. It 
resulted in a breakdown of different speech act types according to their dimensions of 
variability, but it does not imply comparability among different speech act types. It assumes 
that there is cross-linguistic/cross-cultural comparability of individual speech act types 
instead. The theory put forward in the next chapter is of the first kind, although it does 
attempt to do away with some of the assumptions about homogeneous speech 
communities usually associated with this type of theory.  
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Chapter 3: A model of illocutionary forces 
This chapter will outline a model of illocutionary forces based on Searle’s taxonomy of 
speech acts. As will become clear, Searle’s taxonomy is really just the starting point; I 
introduce several changes, inspired by Roman Jakobson’s model of the functions of 
language, and motivated by problems raised by the theory discussed in Chapter 2 and the 
challenge of accounting for a wider range of language-characteristic phenomena in an 
elegant way.  
Throughout this chapter, when I refer to ‘common’ or ‘shared’ code I mean a situation in 
which two or more individuals have the same or very similar associations with a particular 
signal, say ‘cat’ or [khæt] or, as in the myth of Theseus, the colour of a ship’s sails. Sharing a 
large number of such signal associations, along with associations with patterns of their 
combination, is what is in layman’s terms known as sharing a language. We only ever 
encounter the code(s) of another person indirectly, and thus can never be entirely certain of 
how much code we share with them at any given moment. In many instances, however, we 
can in the course of interacting with them get a rough idea of the similarities and 
differences between our codes that is sufficient to enable us to achieve communicative ends 
dependent on the existence of common code. This happens when the evidence of 
commonality is enough to overwhelm our skepticism about the contents of other minds. 
Importantly, a common or shared code is not necessarily a fixed code (cf Harris 1998). The 
only limit on its ephemerality and idiosyncrasy arises from the fact that it must be shared, so 
it cannot be a completely private code. 
Two closely-related characteristics of multilingual societies will figure prominently in the 
changes I introduce. First, multilingual societies produce situations in which there is a dearth 
of code shared by interlocutors: we don’t share a language, or we have different cultural 
backgrounds, etc. with the result that we are unable to communicate fully with some other 
members of the society. Second, multilingual societies produce situations in which there is 
an excess of code shared by interlocutors, an over-abundance of expressive options that 
allows speakers to load many layers of significance into their speech acts. Admittedly, these 
two types of situation would be present (albeit to a lesser extent) even in a completely 
monolingual society (supposing for the sake of argument that such a thing exists) – in any 
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society, actually, in which there was less-than-complete uniformity among its members. But 
I think it is fair to say that they are characteristic of multilingual societies; their prevalence 
would even serve as a measure of the degree of multilingualism in a society, if it were 
possible to measure them. 
3.1 Jakobson’s model of the functions of language31 
Jakobson based his model on an earlier model by Karl Bühler, the Organon Model, which 
delineated three functions: Representational, Expressive and Conative. These reappear 
more or less unchanged in Jakobson’s model, which adds three further functions – phatic, 
poetic and metalingual. Jakobson’s model was also based on the idea of a correspondence 
between distinct functions of language and the elements that constitute any speech event: 
The ADDRESSER sends a MESSAGE to an ADDRESSEE. To be operative the message 
requires a CONTEXT referred to (“referent” in another, somewhat ambiguous 
nomenclature), seizable by the addressee, and either verbal or capable of being 
verbalized; a CODE fully, or at least partially, common to the addresser and the 
addressee (or in other words, to the encoder and decoder of the message); and, 
finally, a CONTACT, a physical channel and psychological connection between the 
addresser and the addressee, enabling them both to enter and stay in 
communication. 
(Jakobson 1980, 81) 
The different functions are essentially different orientations of an utterance toward these 
elements of the speech event. An orientation toward the context constitutes the referential 
function. ‘Context’ here is not limited to the immediate environment of the speech event, 
but includes anything that an utterance can be about. A pure constative would be the 
exemplary instance of the referential function. An orientation toward the addresser in the 
speech event constitutes the emotive or expressive function, which conveys information 
about the speaker’s attitude to something. The conative function is an orientation toward 
                                                          
31 Almost identical descriptions of the model can be found in Jakobson 1960 and Jakobson 1980. Both were 
originally lectures delivered in the late 1950s. The references in this essay are to Jakobson 1980 because it 
is more concise, although the other is more frequently cited. 
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the addressee, exemplified by vocatives and imperatives. An orientation toward the contact 
is the phatic function. This function is clearly evident in utterances intended to initiate, 
maintain or discontinue communication, such as greetings and minimal responses, and is 
the first function acquired by infants. An orientation toward the message, ‘a focus on the 
message for its own sake’ (Jakobson 1980, 84), is the poetic function. Rhyming, alliteration 
and assonance are all examples of the poetic function. Finally, the metalingual function is an 
orientation toward the code. Its use is exemplified by expressions querying and explaining 
meanings, or translating words. 
Central to Jakobson’s model is the idea that several functions are typically present in any 
one speech event, even if certain utterances exemplify one function more obviously than 
another. This property is also important the model described below. 
3.2 Subheading: Changes to Searle’s taxonomy 
3.2.1 Forces, not acts 
The first change is to substitute a study of illocutionary forces for a study of illocutionary 
acts. At one level, this is a minor terminological change with the aim of making the claims of 
the theory more transparent. The word act is a technical term in the work of Austin and 
Searle that has a sense at variance with ordinary usage. Unfortunately, this technical sense 
is never defined and is also not consistently applied. Austin’s use of the word is part of a 
special ontology of action, as was mentioned in section 1.6.2 above. Searle, though he 
admits that his sense of act is such that several acts may be performed simultaneously 
(Searle 1969, 24-5), later criticises Austin’s taxonomy on the grounds that particular speech 
acts may fall into more than one category (Searle 1979, 6), which should not be a problem if 
the earlier sense of act is applied. In moving from acts to forces I am not simply replacing a 
label: a second effect is to shift the overall perspective of the theory from a speaker-centric 
one in which the addressee and the nature of the contact between addresser and addressee 
are assumed to be in some sort of default or normal state (which may actually be very 
unusual or even impossible), to one in which the variability of the contact, code and 
message (cf Jakobson 1980, 81), and the power of the addressee to affect the nature of the 
illocutionary force, are more adequately represented. I am not disputing the right of 
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scientists to make simplifying assumptions or focus on special cases at certain stages in the 
development of an idea, which is Searle’s defence for the assumptions he makes; but we 
should not allow this to prevent us from shedding assumptions wherever possible and 
generalising our ideas to a wider range of phenomena, which is the ultimate aim of 
theorising.  
My use of the word force is essentially the same as Austin’s. It is also similar in some 
respects to the use of the word in physics; but whereas a physical force is something that 
causes a change in a physical space, an illocutionary force causes a change in a social space. 
It is what a particular act of speech must transmit if it is to change the social world, and 
since every act of speech, recognised as such, changes the social world, every particular act 
of speech, recognised as such, transmits some illocutionary force. It is what passes between 
people whenever the social world is changed as a result of a speech event. This is a much 
broader conception of illocutionary force than Austin’s, as will become clear by the end of 
the chapter, but the sense of force is the same. A particular act of speech transmits a 
complex illocutionary force composed of elementary illocutionary forces, which constitute 
the dimensions of illocutionary force. These dimensions are what the taxonomy below 
describes, each of which may be present with a greater or lesser degree of strength. 
Illocutionary forces are like Jakobson’s functions of language in this respect (cf Jakobson 
1980, 82): though one elementary force might be the most prominent in a particular act of 
speech, other elementary forces will always be present alongside the most prominent one.32  
3.2.2 The role of the hearer in the determination of illocutionary force 
With the shift from a theory of acts toward a theory of forces, it no longer makes sense to 
talk, as Searle does, of the “expressed psychological state” of an utterance or sentence. 
Talking in this way implies a view of the utterance (i) as primarily an instrument for the 
speaker to make their psychological state public and (ii) as necessarily sufficient for this 
purpose. A theory of forces views the utterance as primarily the vehicle for the transmission 
of an illocutionary force that may or may not correspond to the intentions of the speaker 
                                                          
32 It is like a piece of music, with various parts harmonising (or disharmonising, as the case may be) with the 
melody. 
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depending on the nature of the uptake of the utterance, which is to a large extent beyond 
the control of the speaker. The speaker, in choosing to say this and not that, in most cases 
places a limit on the possible forces that his or her utterance can transmit; but the precise 
force that ends up being transmitted is determined by the hearer. On receiving a signal from 
a speaker, the hearer attributes a certain psychological state to the speaker. It is this 
attributed psychological state that finally determines what illocutionary force is transmitted.  
It may seem that this view unduly diminishes the authority of the speaker and makes 
conversation seem overly dependent on the comprehension and goodwill of hearers. But if 
one reflects that, in conversation, the speaker will almost immediately get an opportunity to 
clarify his intentions if necessary after the hearer responds, that is, when the conversational 
roles are exchanged, then this view becomes more plausible, and the fact that we often 
have coherent and mutually satisfactory conversations seems less miraculous. Though we 
must surely agree with Derrida that the speaker is in an important sense absent from the 
context of communication (see section 2.3, page 28 above), this absence does not last 
forever. He need not cede control of his utterance; it does not instantly and for all time 
become ‘orphaned and separated . . . from the assistance of its father’ (Derrida 1977, 8). 
This goes for writing as well as speech, though it is perhaps most characteristic of face-to-
face interactions. When in conversation the attributed psychological state is consistently the 
same as the speaker’s actual psychological state, communication proceeds smoothly and 
comfortably because interlocutors all have the same mental picture of what illocutionary 
forces are being transmitted. When there is a difference, then as the conversation proceeds 
this difference may become apparent and be ironed out, and if not, this difference may 
create conflict at some point; but the transmission of illocutionary forces does not stop the 
moment there is a mismatch between the attributed and actual psychological states of the 
speaker unless, perhaps, the conflict becomes a fist-fight, in which case a wholly different 
kind of force is being exchanged – but in any case, a conversation may become a fight even 
without a breakdown in communication. In fact, an illocutionary force may be transmitted 
even if no conversation begins because the interlocutors don’t share a common language 
(see section 3.3.2, page 51 below).  
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                               Fig 1. Ukrainian parliament brawl, 2014 (picture from www.dailydot.com) 
The importance of hearers’ moment-to-moment judgments about the psychological states 
“behind” utterances is recognised by most naturalistic theories of communication (see for 
example Tomasello 2010, Millikan 2005), and accounts for the fact that conversation is 
more looser yet more flexible, at the same time both more and less secure, than Searle’s 
theory implies. It is less secure insofar as it depends on acts of judgment that go beyond acts 
of decoding; more secure insofar as it is able to tolerate temporary conflict. 
45 
 
3.2.3 The effect of social status 
As Bourdieu shows (see section 2.4.2), social relations also play an important part in 
determining when, say, a command can actually be given. As I will show below, all of the 
elementary forces in my model do in fact rely on a particular social status being attributed 
to the speaker. Speech acts are in general unable to function without some social 
guarantee. I will therefore add a parameter for attributed social status to each of the 
elementary forces. I will not, however, attempt to trace these social guarantees to their 
ultimate source, since this is a linguistic theory (cf Bourdieu 1992, 39; see section 2.4.2). One 
has to draw a line somewhere, even if one might easily have drawn it somewhere else. 
As will become clear when I discuss the elementary illocutionary forces individually, social 
status as I understand it is a broad and open-ended concept. In one sentence, it is a person's 
state relative to other people. It may include their reputation, social networks, the offices 
they occupy, powers they possess, their bank balance, etc. Attributed social status is 
obviously limited by what the hearer can attribute to the speaker, though importantly this is 
limited neither by what she knows for certain about nor by the facts of the speaker's social 
status. There is thus a sense in which it is localised around the particular communicative 
episode.  
3.2.4 Non-propositional effects 
A third global change made to Searle’s taxonomy concerns the idea of propositional 
content. I said earlier that illocutionary force is what a particular act of speech must 
transmit if it is to change the social world, and that since every act of speech, recognised as 
such, changes the social world, every particular act of speech, recognised as such, transmits 
some illocutionary force. The ways in which speaking may change the social world are not 
however limited to operations on propositions, a fact has been proven by a generation of 
sociolinguists and that is recognised by Jakobson’s model. I will integrate this much wider 
conception of speech affecting the social world into the model of illocutionary forces. This 
requires replacing the “propositional content” that appears in Searle’s taxonomy with 
something more comprehensive. For reasons which will become evident when I discuss 
poetic and rhetorical forces, propositional content will be expanded into a category I call 
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signal properties. Some but not all elementary illocutionary forces have propositional 
content as a signal property.  
 
Summarising, then, the global changes made to Searle’s taxonomy: (i) a theory of acts is 
replaced by a theory of forces. This moves the theory away from a speaker-centric to a more 
interaction-centric one, which entails (ii) a recognition of the relative importance of the 
psychological state attributed to the speaker by the hearer and the unsustainability of the 
notion of expressed psychological state when fewer assumptions about the speaker’s 
environment are made. It is not by recognising an intention that a hearer understands a 
speech act, but by attributing an intention, by postulating an intention behind the signal he 
receives. This might or might not correspond to the intention that the speaker actually had. 
The speaker’s intentions are not completely irrelevant to the communication, however, 
because he typically cedes control of the interpretation of his speech act only temporarily. 
(iii) Recognition of the fact that social status is just as important as psychological state for 
the transmission of illocutionary force; and (iv) a broadening of the category of 
propositional content to accommodate a more comprehensive account of the ways in which 
speech changes the social world. 
3.2.5 Changes of detail: the question of questions and a matter of notation 
Recall that Searle construed questions (yes-no and wh-) as requests for information and 
therefore classified them as directive speech acts (see section 2.1.3, page 25 above). I 
expressed some dissatisfaction with this classification on the grounds that they are only 
indirectly directives. If we take an uncontroversial example of a request, ‘please close the 
window,’ we find a close relationship between the action requested (that the hearer closes 
the window) and the propositional content. But looking at a question, we find a different 
relationship. Using Searle’s example, ‘does Sam smoke habitually?’, the action called for 
(that the hearer gives the speaker some information) does not resemble the propositional 
content at all. The direction of fit between the propositional content and the world is also 
different. Requests have the world-to-word direction of fit, but questions actually have the 
same word-to-world direction of fit as assertions: the only difference is that it is the hearer 
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of the question who is expected to bring about the fit. Questions stand to assertions in the 
same relationship that directives stand to commissives: in each pair, the first calls on the 
hearer to implement the word-world fit (whereas the second constitutes a commitment by 
the speaker to the fit between word and world). In the case of directives, the fit is supposed 
to be achieved by some physical action (eg closing the window); in the case of questions, 
the fit is supposed to be achieved by confirming or disconfirming an assertion of the speaker 
(in yes-no questions) or by providing an assertion that fills in information missing from the 
speaker’s question (in wh- questions) – in both cases, the hearer (of the question) is 
choosing words that fit the world. Questions therefore share with assertions the word-to-
world direction of fit, and share with directives an orientation toward the hearer. The two 
binary parameters, direction of fit33 and speaker/hearer orientation, combine to generate 
the four speech act types (dimensions of illocutionary force in my model), assertive, 
inquisitive, directive and commissive, which I will call collectively propositional forces 
because they form a set characterised by a relatively straightforward relation between a 
proposition and the world (direction of fit). They are summarised in the following table: 
 Direction of fit S/H orientation 
Assertive ↓ Speaker 
Inquisitive ↓ Hearer 
Directive ↑ Hearer 
Commissive ↑ Speaker 
Table 2: propositional forces 
The notational change I have made to Searle’s taxonomy is to replace his idiosyncratic 
symbols for the major classes of speech acts (├, !, C, E, and D) with a regular set of Greek 
letters for the dimensions of illocutionary force. These will be introduced when each 
individual force is discussed. They were chosen to be suggestive of the corresponding name 
of the elementary force; thus the assertive and poetic forces have the symbols α and π 
respectively. Apart from being clearer, this change also highlights the change to a model of 
forces from a model of acts. I have renamed Searle’s declarational class to 
                                                          
33 Strictly speaking, direction of fit is a ternary parameter. 
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metaconventional, which brings out its reflexive character, and allows me to avoid having 
two elementary forces, declarational and directive, competing for the Greek letter delta. 
Roman capitals will reserved for attributed psychological states, and lower case Roman 
letters for attributed social statuses.  
3.3 Three new forces: phatic, poetic, rhetorical 
This section introduces three new forces to the model, called the phatic, poetic and 
rhetorical forces. They constitute a set characterised by its independence from propositional 
content. The phatic and poetic forces each correspond closely but not exactly to the 
Jakobsonian functions of the same name, and the rhetorical force, though novel, is in some 
ways an extension of the poetic force. They are thus only new to the model; they are not 
new to scholarship or new to the world.  These three forces are prominent in multilingual 
contexts because their independence from propositional content allows them to be 
transmitted where there is a lack of shared code between interlocutors and where an over-
abundance of expressive options adds layers to the communication. 
3.3.1 Phatic force (φ) 
Utterances may transmit a phatic force, φ, if they contribute to the establishment, 
maintenance or discontinuation of communication. The phatic force thus corresponds very 
closely to Jakobson’s phatic function (Jakobson1980, 84), which is the reason for the name. 
Note that Jakobson took the word ‘phatic’ from Malinowski, rather than Austin, who used it 
in a different way (see section 1.3, page 9 above), and my use of the word belongs to the 
Malinowski-Jakobson lineage. Examples of utterances that can transmit a clear phatic force 
are greetings, minimal responses and vocatives. The inclusion of vocatives in this class 
departs from Jakobson, who considered vocatives to be examples of the conative 
(addressee-oriented) function. I consider them φ-transmitters because they are used to get 
a hearer’s attention. The capacity of an utterance to set or alter the frame of an interaction 
is a property of its phatic force. I have a housemate who is trying to teach me French. I greet 
him with ‘comment ça va’ rather than ‘hi’ or ‘how’s it going’ or whatever when I want to 
frame the interaction in a certain way: I want my language choice to transmit a phatic force 
that frames the subsequent interaction as an informal French lesson (which entails that we 
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will try only to speak French, he will speak more slowly, in short sentences and only about 
simple topics, etc.). It should be clear from this that to the extent that an utterance 
interpellates a subject, it does so by virtue of φ, because the subject positions occupied by 
interlocutors are part of the frame of the interaction. My ‘comment ça va’ attempts to 
impose the subject positions ‘French speaker’ and ‘French teacher’ on my housemate (but 
also imposes corresponding subject positions on myself).  
There are no special signal properties required for the transmission of phatic force in the 
case of initiating and maintaining communication. φ can be transmitted in the absence of 
conventions. Just about any noise can function to get someone’s attention and start an 
interaction: saying ‘Hey Sally!’ but also blowing a whistle, clearing one’s throat, waving a 
hand, the ringing of a telephone, etc. Minimal responses are usually just grunts and 
murmurs, and conversation may also be prolonged merely through eye contact. Breaking off 
communication is usually more delicate and requires the use of special formulae, recognised 
as such by both parties (‘bye,’ ‘see you,’ etc.).  
 
Fig 2. ‘Amid a proposal about creating 
direct transport links with Mainland 
China, DPP deputy Wang Shu-hui 
snatched the written proposal and 
shoved it into her mouth . . . She later 
spat the proposal out and tore it up.’ 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legislativ
e_violence#Taiwan). 
Since φ does not require the presence of a proposition, there is no necessary relationship 
between a proposition and the world, i.e. no direction of fit.34 The psychological state that 
the hearer must attribute to the speaker for the utterance to transmit φ is simply the intent 
to communicate or, in the case of φ that alters rather than establishes a frame, the intent to 
communicate in a certain way, which I will abbreviate C. This is in fact a social state as much 
as a psychological one, so the attributed social status is the same. For initiating and 
maintaining speech acts, then, the phatic force looks like this: 
φ = ØCc(Ø) 
                                                          
34 For a proposition to be present, it must be understood by both speaker and hearer. 
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I noted earlier that breaking off communication is more complex than initiating or sustaining 
it, and usually requires the use of special formulae. This aspect of phatic force does 
therefore have a required signal property. 
Jakobson’s aim is to describe functions of language, and this allows him to subsume 
initiating, maintaining and discontinuing signals under a single function. Since signal 
properties distinguish dimensions of force in my model, however, a qualitative distinction 
such as this cannot be ignored: it is taken to suggest that the elementary illocutionary force 
responsible for breaking off communication is different from that which is responsible for 
initiating and maintaining it. I will therefore define two forms of phatic force. The first, 
unmarked form of φ was described above: it is a kind of social gravity, something necessarily 
attractive, or social glue, something necessarily creative or supportive of social bonds. Like 
physical gravity, this social gravity can be opposed – conversations do, after all, sometimes 
end. The force that opposes social gravity, or dissolves social glue, I will call φ-. The signal 
property requirement is that it is a φ- formula recognised by both/all relevant parties. The 
attributed social/psychological state is intent to discontinue communication, which I will 
symbolise C-. The formulation of φ- is therefore: 
φ- = ØC-c-(φ- formula) 
Phatic force incorporates something very like Judith Butler's concept of performativity (see 
Butler 1997) (which was itself derived from Austin's concept of performative utterances). In 
the case of naming, the effect of the performativity of an utterance is to conjure up or 
reproduce a category and simultaneously to confer membership of this category on the 
person named. This idea was influenced by Louis Althusser’s idea of interpellation, 
according to which “hailing” a person (the well-known example he gives is of a policeman 
trying to get someone’s attention in a crowded street) automatically brings a particular 
(typically subordinate) subject-hood into existence and simultaneously foists it on the 
person who responds (Althusser 1971, 163). Naming is thus like a Searlian declaration in the 
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kind of change to the social world it brings about, but unlike a Searlian declaration insofar as 
it is not required to fit into any pre-existing structure of conventions.35 
3.3.2 Poetic force (π)  
In Jakobson’s model, the poetic function of language ‘promot[es] the palpability of signs’ 
and despite its name is not confined to, though it is characteristic of, verbal art (Jakobson 
1980, 85). All signs have some palpable, physical form, which can carry an illocutionary force 
in and of itself. If this physical form is patterned in some way, it can transmit poetic force, π. 
The relevant sense of ‘pattern’ is difficult to define; even the Oxford English Dictionary 
entries are little more than suggestive phrases: ‘a regular or decorative arrangement,’ ‘a 
natural or chance arrangement of shapes or markings having a decorative or striking effect,’ 
‘a discernible order or arrangement in some branch of language, esp. phonology,’ ‘an 
arrangement or relationship of elements, esp. one which indicates or implies an underlying 
causative process other than chance.’ 
Not every use of the physical form of a sign transmits illocutionary force: signs can be used 
as physical objects, but they can transmit illocutionary force only when they are used as 
signs. But deciding precisely where to draw the line is a delicate matter. A puzzle from the 
literature on perlocutionary acts brings us closer to the boundary: it concerned what kind of 
act is performed in waking someone by shouting ‘don’t wake up!’ at them (Gu 1993, 409). 
Insofar as the sleeper wakes up as a result of the physical force of the sound, no π is 
transmitted – it is essentially the same as if one had woken them by throwing a book at 
them. Insofar as they wake up because of an association of loud noises with danger, 
perhaps there could be some phatic force, since waking someone is a species of getting 
their attention, but there is no poetic force because the patterning of the signal is irrelevant. 
Searle’s American prisoner (see section 2.1.2, page 22 above), on the other hand, does 
transmit poetic force, and he would do even if he said ‘Ich bin ein amerikanischer Soldat,’ or 
                                                          
35 According to this view, calling someone particular name takes away from them any response that does not 
at some level imply an acceptance of the name. The performativity of the name is unaffected by such 
linguistic subtleties as negation, reported speech, scare quotes, “mention” versus “use,” etc.  If someone 
calls out ‘hey moron!’ and I turn around to respond, then even if I respond with ‘I am not an moron!’ or 
‘don't call me an moron!’ the theory goes, I have accepted at some level that ‘moron’ referred to me – 
otherwise, why did I respond to the call? 
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if the guard understood the German sentence ‘kennst . . . bluhen’ and realised what the 
prisoner was trying to do. It is only the success of the prisoner’s intentions, and not the 
transmission of illocutionary force, that depends on his hearer having a particular level of 
familiarity with the German language (not too familiar with German, or he will see through 
the prisoner’s ruse; but familiar enough that it does not fall on deaf ears, as it were). 
In these examples the process of association (loud noise – danger, sound pattern – German 
citizen) introduces a gap between the intent of the sign (possibly non-existent, e.g. if the 
noise was caused by the wind) and its interpretation. This gap is responsible for the 
defeasibility of illocutionary force. I will assume therefore that what distinguishes signs used 
as signs is that they involve such a process of association by the hearer. It is not important 
whether the association is natural or conventional, learned or instinctive, conscious or 
unconscious. It is also not important for there to be an association that speaker and hearer 
share, because the transmission of illocutionary force is not a matter of transmitting 
speakers’ meanings or intentions, but a matter of altering the social world. Where does the 
social world end, and the rest of the world begin? Where does “social physics” become 
physics? Perhaps there is ultimately no clear boundary to be drawn here; at any rate I have 
no interest in policing one, so I will simply leave this as a line in the sand.  
Poetic force is mostly responsible for making some speakers and writers seem elegant and 
convincing, while making others seem clumsy and laboured, even as they make identical 
arguments. It can communicate doubt or belief, distance or intimacy, admiration or 
contempt, or simply produce a peculiar kind of semiotic pleasure. The quotability of the 
political slogan ‘I like Ike’ derives from its poetic force (Jakobson 1980, 85). The call 
‘amandla!’ and response ‘awethu!’ have conventional meanings, but their rousing effect is 
at least partly dependent on syllabic and prosodic structure, which contribute to poetic 
force: call and response both have three syllables and begin with the same sound; the final 
sound of the call links it to the first sound of the response. Consider also the way it is usually 
rapidly repeated.  
Anyone who has lived in a multilingual society or has spent time among people who speak a 
language they don’t understand will be familiar with the experience of “other languages”: 
the experience of hearing sounds (or reading words or gestures) to which they can attach no 
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meaning, while at the same time having no doubt that other speakers and hearers do attach 
meaning to the sounds. We hear the particular music of the language. In such situations 
poetic force is the only illocutionary force that may be transmitted to the uncomprehending 
hearer apart from phatic force.36 π is salient not only when there is a lack, but also when 
there is an excess of common code. Code-switching, which takes advantage of such an 
excess, is equally characteristic of multilingual contexts. It transmits π when this or that 
code is chosen on the basis of its sound.  
There is no direction of fit associated with π because it doesn’t require the presence of a 
proposition. The signal properties required for the transmission of π is that it should be 
patterned. The attributed psychological state is hard to describe, but it includes the ability 
to recognise and produce patterns, so I will call it P. This is the minimum psychological state 
that needs to be postulated by the hearer to allow the transmission of π. It is really more of 
a mental capacity than a psychological state. π is perhaps the only dimension that requires 
no social status to be attributed – the ability to process patterns in the required way seems 
purely neurological to me. Note that π excludes natural patterns; the universe throws up 
some beautiful patterns and we can find striking regularities in the physical world, but they 
are not transmitted to us through poetic force.  The formulation of poetic force is: 
π = ØPØ(patterned) 
3.3.3 Rhetorical force (ρ) 
This force has no direct counterpart in Jakobson’s model. Consider another American 
political slogan, ‘a chicken in every pot and a car in every garage.’ There is a phonetic 
pattern of short and long vowels in the stressed syllables, [tʃɪkən pɑt kɒː gærɑːʒ] that 
transmits poetic force. But there is also a pattern in the meanings of the words that is 
independent of the phonetic pattern and that would persist even if the words were replaced 
with different-sounding synonyms (‘a small, domestic bird in every cooking vessel and a 
motorised carriage in every personal automobile hangar’). The figure contained:container is 
                                                          
36 A faint phatic force is transmitted in this situation to the extent that the possibility of translation is 
recognised. 
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repeated, combining with the phonetic patter to give the slogan a memorable symmetry. 
This kind of pattern in meaning transmits rhetorical force, ρ.  
In his discussion of the poetic function, Jakobson claims that it is ‘not the sole function of 
verbal art but only its dominant, determining function’ (Jakobson 1980, 85). Rhetorical force 
is another prominent aspect of verbal art and is arguably just as dominant as poetic force in 
poetry, and even more so in prose. Here’s an example of a pattern in meaning from The 
Trial by Franz Kafka. K, the protagonist, is exploring a mysterious room at his office: 
It was, as he had correctly assumed, a lumber room. Bundles of useless old papers 
and empty earthenware ink-bottles lay in a tumbled heap behind the threshold. But 
in the room itself stood three men, stooping because of the low ceiling, by the light 
of a candle stuck on a bookcase. ‘What are you doing here?’ asked K., in a voice 
broken with agitation but not loud. One of the men, who was clearly in authority and 
took the eye first, was sheathed in a sort of dark leather garment which left his 
throat and a good deal of his chest and the whole of his arms bare. He made no 
answer. But the other two cried: ‘Sir! We’re to be flogged because you complained 
about us to the Examining Magistrate.’ And only then did K. realise that it was 
actually the warders Franz and Willem, and that the third man was holding a rod in 
his hand with which to beat them. 
(Kafka 1953, 94-5) 
In this passage, Kafka begins with incidental details and ends with human drama. There is a 
reversal of the sequence in which the elements of the scene would probably be noticed that 
creates a peculiar rhetorical force.37  
I’ve used political slogans and examples from literature to illustrate rhetorical force because 
they typically make heavy use of it in order to be suggestive; but of course ordinary 
utterances also transmit ρ. It may also be transmitted unintentionally, as in so-called 
Freudian slips or when the speaker is simply unaware of meaning patterns he is producing. 
In Excitable Speech Judith Butler analyses how the image of fire is repeated and transformed 
                                                          
37 There are actually several reversals like this in The Trial. 
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in a particular Supreme Court Judgment (Butler 1997), and we saw earlier (see Section 2.3, 
page 30 above) how Derrida traced the image of disease in his criticism of Austin’s 
treatment of fictional speech acts. The rhetorical forces uncovered by analyses like these 
are transmitted independently of what the writer’s intention. ρ does not necessarily 
“elevate” the utterance, as it is usually intended to do in literature, or make it more 
persuasive, as it is usually intended to do in political and advertising slogans. It simply adds 
another layer of significance to the speech event. 
Like π, ρ is salient in multilingual contexts where there is a shortage of common code, since 
it can be transmitted when the hearer understands the meaning of single words without 
understanding whole sentences. ρ is salient where there is an abundance of common code, 
too, because of the greater lexical choice such a situation creates. Speakers may draw from 
the resources of different languages to express nuances and contrast. 
Like the phatic and poetic forces, the rhetorical force does not require the presence of a 
proposition, so there is no direction of fit. The only required signal property is that it should 
contain meaning accessible to speaker and hearer. The psychological state attributed to the 
producer is that he/she understands and uses symbols: I’ll abbreviate this state with S. The 
social status attributed to the speaker is that he/she belongs to a symbolic community that 
includes the hearer, that is, they should share some common code. I’ll abbreviate this with 
‘s.’ The formulation of rhetorical force is as follows: 
ρ = ØSs(meaningful) 
3.4 The propositional forces revisited 
The four propositional forces were mentioned in section 3.2.5 (pages 46-7), but it remains 
to see precisely how they fit into the model of illocutionary force under construction. They 
were distinguished among themselves by combining two parameters: speaker/hearer 
orientation and direction of fit (see Table 2 on page 47). Direction of fit has appeared in the 
formulations of the phatic, poetic and rhetorical forces presented so far (although it has not 
been relevant to these proposition-independent forces), and it will appear in the 
formulations given here for the propositional forces. Readers will notice that S/H orientation 
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does not appear explicitly. It is represented implicitly by the values for attributed 
psychological state. 
Before discussing the propositional forces, a remark on the concept of proposition will be 
necessary, because I will use the term in a wider sense than it is normally used in 
philosophy. Recall from Section 2.1.2 (pages 24-5 above) that Searle drew a distinction 
between propositions and utterances, to account for the constant in ‘Sam smokes 
habitually’ and ‘Mr Samuel Martin is a regular smoker of tobacco’ – while they are different 
utterances, with different illocutionary forces, they express the same proposition. The same 
goes for utterances in different languages: ‘I live in Cape Town,’ ‘ek woon in Kaapstad’ and 
‘ndihlala eKapa’ all contain the same proposition – the proposition itself is independent of 
the means of its expression. This is a completely standard use of the term in philosophy. 
However, even while acknowledging that they are distinct from particular languages and/or 
particular utterances, the possibility of expressing a proposition by entirely other means 
does not fall under the standard philosophical use of the term. In my usage, a raised hand, a 
conspicuous cough, or a raised eyebrow can all express the same proposition as ‘I am here.’ 
Probably the most important implication of this novel usage for my model is that it allows 
multiple propositions to be expressed simultaneously – the fact that a particular dimension 
of illocutionary force depends on the presence of a particular type of proposition does not 
imply that another dimension, depending on a different type of proposition, cannot be 
transmitted at the same time.  
Bearing in mind these remarks about the definition of the term ‘proposition,’ it is in most 
cases fairly straightforward to translate Searle’s assertive, directive and commissive classes 
of speech acts into dimensions of illocutionary force. The symbol for the assertive and 
inquisitive forces are α and χ respectively. As already noted, they both have the word-to-
world (↓) direcaon of ﬁt. The asserave and inquisiave forces require the presence of a 
proposition (in simple cases, referent + predicate: see Section 2.1.2, pages 21-2 above) to be 
asserted or queried, and any proposition may be asserted or queried. The required signal 
property for α and χ is therefore that it expresses a proposition accessible to both speaker 
and hearer, which I will symbolise p. Different propositions may be present to different 
hearers of the same utterance – imagine a Cold War spy sitting down next to someone on a 
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bench in a public place and saying ‘the snow is good in Stalingrad this year, isn't it?’ To 
another spy, this might express the same proposition as ‘are you a spy?’ To anyone else it 
will express a proposition about snow. The attributed psychological state for α is that the 
speaker believes the proposition, symbolised B. There are two important points to be made 
here: (i) This does not imply that one must believe what one asserts; but if, as a hearer, one 
does not think that the speaker believes what they is saying, then their utterance is likely to 
appear “in a certain way hollow or void” (cf Austin 1962, 22). This hollowness is captured in 
my model as a lack of assertive force. (ii) α is not the only channel through which we come 
to believe facts: we can come to believe, for example, facts about a person’s social history 
on the basis of her accent (π) or lexical choices (ρ), or simply by inspecting the world (no 
illocutionary force). What distinguishes α (and accounts for its defeasibility) is its 
dependence on this attributed belief, not the speaker’s actual beliefs and not its truth or 
falsity. The attributed psychological state for the transmission of inquisitive force is 
uncertainty about some element (in simple cases, the referent or the predicate) of the 
proposition, and the desire that the hearer remove this uncertainty. This will be symbolised 
U. Both the assertive and commissive forces depend upon the speaker having a favourable 
reputation, which is an element of the social status attributed to them. Consider the fable of 
the boy who cried wolf, and a child who pesters a parent by asking ‘why?’ after every thing 
they say soon stops getting answers, because they have gained a (short-term) reputation for 
“asking stupid questions.” The formulations for assertive and inquisitive force, therefore, 
are as follows: 
α = ↓Br(p) 
χ = ↓Ur(p) 
The symbols for the directive and commissive forces are δ and κ respectively. They both 
have the world-to-word (↑) direcaon of ﬁt and also require the presence of a proposiaon.  
δ requires a proposition of the form ‘H does A’ and κ requires a proportion of the form ‘S 
does A’ (see section 2..1.3, page 24 above). The more restrictive signal properties of these 
two forces mean that the sets of propositions which they define are subsets of the set of 
propositions that may be asserted or queried. Thus, for example, a signal containing a 
proposition of the form ‘H does A’ can be simultaneously queried and requested (‘could you 
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fetch me at 5?’). The attributed psychological state for the transmission of the directive 
force is that the speaker desires that the hearer do the action specified by the proposition. 
This will be symbolised D. The attributed psychological state for the transmission of the 
commissive force is that the speaker intends to do the action specified by the proposition. 
This will be symbolised I. The commissive force, like α and χ, depends on the reputation of 
the speaker, so the attributed social status is ‘r’. Politicians as a group have a reputation for 
making empty campaign promises: Jacob Zuma promises free healthcare for all, Helen Zille 
promises six million jobs in the Northern Cape, and civil society yawns.  
The directive force, though, presents an interesting problem. Commands and requests are 
very similar from the point of view of representation, which is why, following Searle, I have 
placed them together in the category of directives. On the other hand, from the point of 
view of power, the way one tries to get someone to do something is very different in 
commands and requests: in the former it is with reference to the speaker’s symbolic power, 
in the latter it is with reference to the hearer’s  
willingness/ability (cf section 2.4, page 32ff above). 
There seems to be an incommensurability here; a 
model in which power was the primary organising 
principle would separate commands and requests, a 
model in which representation is primary joins them. 
The model under consideration makes representation 
primary, but no doubt a similar model could be built 
that make power relations primary. I will analyse 
requests as directives that create a sort of “symbolic 
power vacuum” by interpellating their addressee as 
someone able to fulfil the request, i.e. as powerful.38 
The category of directives has two subcategories, δ and δ-, exemplified by commands and 
requests respectively. Direction of fit and signal properties are the same for both, since the 
                                                          
38 Though as far as I know Althusser only ever considered the process of interpellation by large-scale state 
apparatuses and through their agents, I see no reason why it cannot apply too in the fleeting, miniature 
societies created whenever people communicate, and by ostensibly less powerful actors. Call this 
“interpellation lite,” if you like. 
 
  Fig. 3 Command or request? 
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manner of representation is the same. The only difference is whether the hearer attributes 
a greater (command) or lesser (request) symbolic power to the speaker, symbolised p and p- 
respectively. This power difference is in general a more important determinant of 
illocutionary force than the grammatical form of the utterance. 
The formulations for δ and κ are thus similar, in appearance at least, as the corresponding 
speech act classes in Searle’s typology: 
δ(-) = ↑Dp(-)(p=‘S does A’) 
κ = ↑Ip(p=‘H does A’) 
3.5 Expressive and metaconventional forces and the status of metalanguage 
The expressive and metaconventional dimensions of illocutionary force are also fairly 
straightforward translations from the corresponding speech act classes (expressive and 
declaration respectively) in Searle’s taxonomy. The symbol for the expressive dimension is ε. 
The direction of fit is Ø, as in Searle’s system, for the same reasons (see section 2.1.3, page 
24-5 above). The signal must contain a proposition of the form ‘S/H + some property.’ 
Propositions of this form overlap with propositions of other forms, which allows utterances 
like ‘stop doing that!’ to transmit ε (disapproval), δ (that H stop doing it) and α (to a third 
party, the information that H is doing it; or to H, if he doesn’t realise he is doing it). The 
psychological state that must be attributed to the speaker is that she has some attitude 
(delight, disbelief, doubt, confident indifference, etc.) toward the proposition contained in 
the signal. I’ll symbolise this A. Similar remarks apply to ε as applied to α: (i) one may 
apologise insincerely, and the hollowness of an apology judged to be insincere is precisely 
its lack of expressive force; and (ii) there are means of forming an opinion about someone’s 
attitudes other than by transmissions of expressive force. As with α, χ, and κ, being able to 
transmit expressive force depends on a speaker’s reputation. The mechanical apology of a 
criminal at the end of a long trial during which he has shown no remorse is unlikely to 
transmit expressive force.   
The symbol for the metaconventional dimension is μ. As in Searle’s system, the direction of 
fit for μ is word-to-world and world-to-word; μ is transmitted by signals fitting into some 
60 
 
conventionalised procedure, and their production then effects some change in the world; 
people are hired or fired, become married, score goals, words are defined, ships are named, 
etc. Of course, much of the world eludes the power of metaconventional force: the 
transmission of μ will never boil water, and one would struggle in most situations to define 
fish as ‘a kind of large, furry biped’ by μ. Only aspects of the world that are in a certain way 
higher on an (admittedly difficult-to-define) scale of conventionality (that is, in a certain way 
“more” conventional) can be affected by μ. The signal property required for μ is that it 
expresses a proposition which is “more” conventional than, and therefore subject to the 
power of, the means of expression. μ obviously depends on a social status being attributed 
to the speaker (being recognised as a judge or marriage officer, for instance). This status 
varies according to the procedure the speaker is attempting to carry out. This variable social 
status will be symbolised x. The attributed psychological state is Ø, since the correct 
performance on the procedure is sufficient to transmit the force if the appropriate social 
status is attributed.  
The formulations of the expressive and metaconventional forces are: 
ε = ØAr(p=‘S/H + some property’) 
μ = ↕Øx(p=+conventional) 
A word on metalanguage will be appropriate here. As Jakobson and others (e.g. Harris 1998) 
have pointed out, the most ordinary verbal interactions are replete with metalinguistic 
formulae like ‘when I said X, I meant that Y,’ ‘what do you mean by X?’ ‘can you repeat that 
please?’ ‘but yesterday you said Z!’ ‘P means Q,’ ‘I was being sarcastic’ and so on. Jakobson’s 
model has a metalingual function that gathers together all utterances focussed upon the 
code being used (Jakobson 1980, 86-7), and readers familiar with Jakobson’s model might 
wonder why I have not translated this function into my model. One might assume that 
metalanguage consists of transmissions of metaconventional force, where the convention in 
question is a convention of the language being used. But metalinguistic utterances do not 
necessarily concern conventional aspects of an utterance. For example, they may concern 
the intention behind a remark (‘did you mean that as an insult?’) or physical properties of 
the utterance (‘don’t talk so loudly!’). In fact, what arguably characterises a metalinguistic 
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utterance is not that it transmits a particular illocutionary force, but that the utterance is in 
some way concerned with or “about” earlier or forthcoming utterances. So, for example, 
the most prominent force of an utterance of ‘I was being sarcastic’ is likely to be the 
assertive force; what makes it a metalinguistic utterance is the fact that it concerns the 
illocutionary force (ε in this case) of an earlier utterance; what I will call the object force, as 
opposed to primary force. The object force is a force name only – it undergoes a kind of 
illocutionary bleaching comparable to the semantic bleaching that occurs in the process of 
grammaticalisation. Here are some more examples: 
Utterance Primary force Object force 
‘did you call me?’ χ φ 
‘I define x as y’ μ α 
‘go and apologise at once!’ δ ε 
‘I highly doubt that’ ε α 
Table 3: some metalinguistic utterances 
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Finally, here is a table of the complete set of dimensions of illocutionary force.  
Dimension Symbol Dir. of fit Attr. psych. state Attr. soc. status Signal properties 
Phatic φ (φ-)  Ø C (C-) c (c-) Ø (φ- formula) 
Poetic π Ø P Ø patterned 
Rhetorical ρ Ø S s meaningful 
Assertive α ↓ B r p 
Inquisitive χ ↓ U r p 
Commissive κ ↑ I p p=‘H does A’ 
Directive δ(-) ↑ D p(-) p=‘S does A’ 
Expressive ε Ø A r p=‘S/H + some 
property’ 
Metaconven
-tional 
μ ↕ Ø x p=+conventional 
Table 4: Dimensions of illocutionary force 
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Conclusion 
Chapter Three described a new(ish) model of illocutionary forces intended to widen the 
coverage of earlier models by combining them and integrating certain criticisms. What 
remains to be done is to consider certain questions arising from the model that may point in 
the direction of further research: Is the model “applicable,” to empirical research or in any 
other way? Can elementary illocutionary forces be detected? What is the point of the 
abbreviated, “formal” notation? In what way(s) could the model be developed further? 
The abbreviated notation for the dimensions of illocutionary force is obviously based on 
Searle’s taxonomy. Though it is a matter of speculation what purpose Searle’s notation was 
originally supposed to serve, its later development (see Searle & Vanderveken’s Foundations 
of illocutionary logic, 1984) suggests that he conceived of it as an extension of the notation 
of formal logic, standing beside modal and epistemic logic, and that he envisaged the 
development of an algebra of speech acts. I have more modest expectations for my 
notation. I consider it no more than a distillation of the information that is more 
comprehensively and reliably encoded in traditional sentences. The abbreviations of the 
different dimensions of illocutionary force are not expected to stand on their own; they are 
simply abbreviations.  
One downside of a theory of illocutionary force that models the transmission of multiple 
forces in parallel is that it does not allow for speech acts to be placed in clear-cut categories. 
By contrast, the CCSARP coding scheme, for example, assumed that requests and apologies 
were categories with fairly well-defined boundaries, such that it could be established with 
reasonable certainty that a given utterance was, say, a request. Different ways of signalling 
a request could then be investigated and compared (see section 2.5, pages 35-8 above). The 
model presented here suggests an alternate empirical procedure that is in some ways the 
reverse of that employed in studies using the CCSARP coding scheme or a variation thereof. 
Instead of investigating the different signal forms taken by a given functional category, it 
suggests investigating the different functions that can be performed by a given signal form, 
such as ‘sorry.’ Determining the illocutionary force of an utterance precisely could not be an 
exact science: the transmission of illocutionary force, as content, to an observing third party 
depends after all on another transmission of illocutionary force in which the third party is in 
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the position of receiver (cf section 3.2.2 pages 42-4 above); and even if it was possible to 
exhaustively describe the state of the social space immediately before and after the 
utterance, one could not infer anything about what force had been transmitted because 
there are ways in which the social space may be affected other than by transmissions of 
illocutionary force – social space leaks (cf Sapir 1921, 38). For a third party to determine the 
mix of elementary illocutionary forces present in a particular speech act will always require 
a certain amount of careful, informed guesswork.39 
Though this is a way in which the model could be applied, I don't think that applicability in 
this sense is the only useful outcome of theoretical work. As far as I know, neither 
Jakobson's theory of functions nor Austin's theory of illocutionary force have been “applied” 
in any classical sense; yet both must arguably be considered successful theoretical works 
because they have stimulated thought about a particular topic. In general, there seem to be 
two ways of defending a particular taxonomy. On the one hand one might defend it on the 
grounds of its utility. The Dewey decimal system for classifying books is a useful tool for 
librarians and library users, even if there is no real boundary between, say, the 300s (social 
sciences) and the 400s (language), and even if the universe of books could easily have been 
broken down in other ways. Still, not every principle of organisation is equally useful: a 
system that ordered books according to their weight or volume or the colour of their covers 
would be less useful than the Dewey system. Clearly, the utility of a classification is not 
completely independent of the nature of the entities being classified – a classification 
according to subject makes sense because of the nature of books. Thus, the second way to 
defend a taxonomy is on the grounds that it, as the saying goes, carves nature at its joints. 
The Periodic Table of the Elements, for example, organises the chemical elements into 
columns with similar properties. The justification sought for the taxonomy of illocutionary 
forces described in this essay is the second kind, though it falls outside the scope of this 
essay to attempt any kind of rigorous proof of a correspondence between the categories of 
the model and categories in nature.  
                                                          
39 This is often not as big a problem as it seems since we have been practicing for almost our whole lives, but in 
less familiar cultural contexts it can obviously become a serious problem. 
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The semiotic theories of Charles Sanders Peirce have become influential in some areas of 
linguistics, and it would be interesting to see if the details of his theories interact in any way 
with the model presented here. For example, it might be possible to treat the contribution 
of the hearer to illocutionary force more systematically than I have done here in terms of 
Peirce’s various typologies of interpretants. At first glance, π and ρ would seem to depend 
on emotional interpretants, α and κ on logical interpretants, and χ and δ on logical and 
energetic interpretants (see Rellstab 2008, 324 and references cited there). Another 
possible avenue of investigation is the precise relationship between the different 
elementary forces in the present model and Peirce’s symbolic, indexical and iconic signs. 
Should they be added as further dimensions of illocutionary force? I am not certain of the 
answer to this question, but I think that symbols, indices and icons are different ways of 
transmitting force rather than different forces. It is possibly relevant that propositions can 
be expressed indexically (the proverbial smoke expresses the same proposition as ‘there is a 
fire here’) or iconically (the no-smoking sign, though not a pure icon, expresses the same 
proposition as ‘thou shalt not smoke here’), and that the rhetorical force in the present 
model makes reference to meaning (i.e. Peirce’s symbols).  
Other possible avenues of exploration include topics mentioned but not covered in this 
paper. What exactly is the illocutionary force of fiction? I suspect that the crucial element 
here is the transmission between author and reader, not that between fictional 
interlocutors. There is also a great deal of fascinating research into humans’ pragmatic 
development, from both an onto- and phylogenetic perspective. Research into the quasi-
linguistic abilities of other great apes and prelinguistic infants appears to have moved on in 
the last twenty years from the question of whether they have a specific computational 
ability (syntax), to how they use signs to perform social acts (pragmatics). Reviewing the 
model presented here in the light of this research might suggest a sensible way of ordering 
the elementary forces and could reveal weaknesses and outright errors.  
The most promising future for this work, therefore, is probably not empirical application but 
further theoretical integration. It is, after all, itself a work of theoretical integration. 
66 
 
References 
Althusser, Louis. 1971. Lenin and philosophy and other essays. Translated from French by 
 Ben Brewster. London. New Left Books. 
Anscombe, G. E. M. 1957. Intention. Oxford. Basil Blackwell. 
Attardo, Salvatore. 1997. Locutionary and Perlocutionary cooperation: the perlocutionary 
 cooperative principle. Journal of Pragmatics 27, 753-79. 
Austin, John L.. 1962. How to do things with words. Second revised edition 1975. Oxford. 
 Oxford University Press. 
Bach, Kent. 1975. Performatives Are Statements Too. Philosophical Studies: An International 
 Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 28(4), 229-36. 
Black, Max. 1963. Austin on Performatives. Philosophy 38(145), 217-26. 
Blum-Kulka, Shoshana & Elite Olshtain. 1984. Requests and Apologies: A Cross-Cultural 
 Study of Speech Act Realization Patterns (CCSARP). Applied Linguistics 5(3), 196-213. 
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1992. Language and symbolic power. Translated from French by Raymond, 
 Gino & Matthew Adamson. Cambridge. Polity. 
Butler, Judith. 1997. Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative. London & New York. 
 Routledge.  
Chomsky, Noam. 1965. Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. Cambridge, MA. MIT Press. 
Coulmas, Florian (ed). 1981. Conversational routine: Explorations in standardized 
 communication situations and prepatterned speech. New York. Mouton 
Derrida, Jacques. 1988. Limited Inc. Evanston. Northwestern University Press. 
Garcia-Carpintero, Manuel. 2013. Explicit performatives revisited. Journal of Pragmatics 49, 
1-17. 
Grandy, Richard E. & Richard Warner (eds). 1986. Philosophical grounds of rationality: 
 intentions, categories, ends. Oxford & New York. Oxford University Press. 
67 
 
Gu, Yueguo. 1993. The impasse of perlocution. Journal of Pragmatics 20, 405-32.  
Hancher, Michael. 1979. The Classification of Cooperative Illocutionary Acts. Language in 
 Society 8(1), 1-14. 
Harris, Roy. 1998. Introduction to integrational linguistics. Oxford. Pergamon. 
House, Juliane & Gabriele Kasper. 1981. Politeness markers in English and German. In 
 Florian Coulmas (ed). Conversational routine: Explorations in standardized 
 communication situations and prepatterned speech, 157-86. New York. Mouton. 
Jakobson, Roman. 1960. Closing Statement: Linguistics and Poetics. In Sebeok, Thomas (ed). 
 Style in language, 350-77. New York, Wiley. 
Jakobson, Roman. 1980. The framework of language. Michigan. Ann Arbor. 
Johansson, Ingvar. 2003. Performatives and Antiperformatives. Linguistics and Philosophy 
 26(6), 661-702. 
Joseph, John E., Nigel Love and Talbot J. Taylor. 2001. Landmarks in Linguistic Thought II: 
 The Western Tradition in the Twentieth Century. London & New York. Routledge. 
Kafka, Franz. 1925 (1953). The Trial. Translated from German by Muir, Willa and Edwin. 
 London. Harmondsworth. 
Millikan, Ruth. 2005. Language: a biological model. Oxford. Clarendon Press. 
Nussbaum, Martha. 2000. The Professor of Parody. The New Republic, Nov. 28, 2000. 
Reich, Wendelin. 2011. The cooperative nature of communicative acts. Journal of 
 Pragmatics 43, 1349–65. 
Rellstab, Daniel Hugo. 2008. Peirce for Linguistic Pragmaticists. Transactions of the Charles S. 
 Peirce Society, 44(2), 312-45 
Rosaldo, Michelle. 1982. The Things We Do with Words: Ilongot Speech Acts and Speech Act 
 Theory in Philosophy. Language in Society 11(2), 203-37. 
68 
 
Sadock, Jerrold M. 1994. Toward a grammatically realistic typology of speech acts. In 
 Tsohatzidis, Savas L. (ed). Foundations of speech act theory: philosophical and 
 linguistic perspectives, 393-406. London. Routledge. 
Sapir, Edward. 1921. Language: an introduction to the study of speech. London. Hart-Davis. 
Sbisà, Marina. 2007. How to read Austin. Pragmatics 17(3), 461-73. 
Schiffer, Steven R.. 1972. Meaning. Oxford. Clarendon Press. 
Searle, John. 1968. Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts. The Philosophical Review 
 77(4), 405-24. 
Searle, John. 1969. Speech Acts. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 
Searle, John. 1977. Reiterating the Differences - A Reply to Derrida. Glyph 2, 172-208. 
Searle, John. 1979. Expression and meaning: studies in the theory of speech acts. Cambridge 
 & New York. Cambridge University Press. 
Searle, John. 1986. Meaning, Communication, and Representation. In Grandy, Richard E. & 
 Richard Warner (eds). Philosophical grounds of rationality: intentions, categories, 
 ends, 209-26. Oxford & New York. Oxford University Press. 
Searle, John. 1989. How Performatives Work. Linguistics and Philosophy 12(5), 535-58. 
Searle, John and Daniel Vanderveken. 1984. Foundations of illocutionary logic. Cambridge & 
 New York. Cambridge University Press. 
Sebeok, Thomas (ed). 1960. Style in language. New York, Wiley. 
Spielmann, Roger W. 1980. Performative Utterances as Indexical Expressions: Comment on 
 Harris. Journal of Linguistics 16(1) 89-93. 
Tomasello, Michael. 2010. Origins of human communication. Cambridge MA & London. MIT 
 Press. 
Tsohatzidis, Savas L. (ed). 1994. Foundations of speech act theory: philosophical and 
 linguistic perspectives. London. Routledge. 
